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Abstract
We suggest the rst large-scale international comparison of labor supply elasticities
for 17 European countries and the US, separately by gender and marital status, with
measurement di¤erences netted out by using a harmonized empirical approach and
comparable data sources. We nd that own-wage elasticities are relatively small and
much more uniform across countries than previously considered. Nonetheless, such
di¤erences do exist, and are found not to arise from di¤erent tax-benet systems,
wage/hour level or demographic compositions across countries, suggesting genuine dif-
ferences in work preferences across countries. Furthermore, three other important
results for welfare analysis are consistent across countries: the extensive (participa-
tion) margin dominates the intensive (hours) margin; for singles, this leads to larger
labor supply responses in low-income groups; and income elasticities are extremely
small everywhere. Finally, the results for cross-wage elasticities in couples are opposed
between regions, consistent with complementarity in spousesleisure in the US versus
substitution in their household production in Europe.
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1 Introduction
The study of labor supply behavior continues to play an important role in policy analysis
and economic research. In particular, the size and distribution of work hour and partici-
pation elasticities represent key information when evaluating tax-benet policy reforms and
their e¤ect on tax revenue, employment and redistribution. Several excellent surveys report
evidence on elasticities for di¤erent countries and periods.1 However, the literature only
reaches a consensus on certain aspects, establishing that own-wage elasticities are largest
for married women and small or sometimes negative for men. In terms of magnitude, large
variation in labor supply elasticities is found in the literature, with little agreement among
economists on the elasticity size that should be used in economic policy analyses (Fuchs et
al., 1998).2 Admittedly, much of the variation across studies is due to di¤erent methodolog-
ical choices, including the type of data used (tax register data or interview-based surveys),
selection (e.g. households with or without children), the period of observation (see Heim,
2007) and estimation method.3
Beyond such di¤erences in empirical methods, the following question remains: do genuine dif-
ferences that could be explained by di¤erent demographic compositions, tax-benet systems,
labor market conditions and cultural backgrounds exist between countries? While consistent
ndings across a large number of countries could make some of the policy recommendations
more broadly viable, inversely, contrasted results may explain di¤erent policy choices; for
instance, di¤erent degrees of redistribution between welfare systems. The implicit cost of re-
distribution between European systems has recently received renewed attention (Immervoll
et al., 2007), yet information on actual international di¤erences in labor supply behavior was
lacking. Another related question concerns whether participation decisions (the extensive
margin) systematically prevail over responses in terms of work hours (the intensive mar-
1Those written in the 1980s focus on estimations using the continuous labor supply model of Hausman
(1981) and provide evidence for individuals in couples (Hausman, 1985, Pencavel, 1986, for married men,
Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986, for married women). More recent surveys incorporate other methods (see
Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) including life-cycle models (see Meghir and Phillips, 2008, and Keane, 2011).
2For instance, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report uncompensated wage elasticities ranging from  0:01
to 2:03 for married women, while Evers et al. (2008) indicate huge variation in elasticity estimates.
3Bargain and Peichl (2013) have collected empirical evidence from the literature, focusing on estimates
for the EU-15 countries (the 15 members of the EU prior to May 1, 2004) and the US. For each demographic
group, they observe a very large variance in estimates across all available studies, pointing to data year and
estimation methods as the main sources of variation. Bargain and Peichl (2013) show that international
comparisons based on existing evidence are generally imperfect and incomplete, with insu¢ cient common
support across studies to conclude about genuine di¤erences in labor supply responsiveness between coun-
tries. The only clear pattern in the literature is that elasticities are larger for women in countries where
their participation rate is lower (for instance in Ireland and Italy, compared to Nordic countries). How-
ever, estimates are missing or scarce for several EU countries and also some demographic groups, such as
childless single individuals. Accordingly, this situation justies the present attempt to estimate labor supply
elasticities for a large number of Western countries in a comparable manner.
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gin). Indeed, this issue gives rise to the debate about whether welfare programs should be
directed to the workless poor, through traditional demogrant policies, or the working poor,
via in-work support (Saez, 2001). Large participation responses may subsequently lead to
large elasticities in the lower part of the income distribution, which is crucial for welfare
analysis (see Eissa et al., 2008). Finally, the optimal taxation of couples, and notably the
issue of joint versus individual taxation, critically rely on the knowledge of cross-wage elas-
ticities of spouses (Immervoll et al., 2011). At present, empirical evidence on labor supply
responsiveness from an international perspective is virtually absent from the literature.4
The present paper attempts to ll this gap, providing the rst set of comparable labor supply
elasticity estimates for 17 EU countries and the US. For this purpose, we suggest a harmo-
nized approach that nets out possible measurement di¤erences arising from data, periods
and methods. We benet from a unique set of data with comparable variable denitions,
estimating the same labor supply model for each country. To establish consistent cross-
country comparisons, we rely on a structural discrete choice model.5 In this context, the
identication is usually obtained by the nonlinearity of the tax-benet code. This present
study o¤ers the opportunity to have the complete simulation of all direct tax and transfer
instruments for 18 countries at our disposal, so that we can fully exploit all nonlinearities and
discontinuities in household budget constraints. In addition, we exploit some geographical
(e.g. across US states) and time variation in tax-benet policies for some of the countries,
which allows us to estimate elasticities for all demographic groups including childless singles
and individuals in couples; this makes the present study very comprehensive compared to
existing studies, which typically focus on particular groups.
4To our knowledge, only Evers et al. (2008) gather evidence for a large set of countries, with their meta
estimations controlling for di¤erent dimensions, including country xed e¤ects and methodological di¤erences
across studies. However, there may not be enough variation across existing studies, and moreover not enough
studies per country, to isolate genuine international di¤erences from other factors. Furthermore, the special
issue of the JHR published in 1990 provided evidence from di¤erent countries using variants of the Hausman
approach (see Mo¢ tt, 1990, for an overview). However, these studies bear methodological di¤erences that
prevent their estimates from being directly comparable.
5We focus our analysis on labor supply responses in a static framework (referred to by Chetty et al.,
2011 as steady-state elasticities). We exclusively analyze labor supply decisions (hours and participation)
and ignore the other margins captured in the literature concerning the elasticity of taxable income (see Saez
et al., 2012). Arguably, these other margins partly relate to responses not directly pertaining to productive
behavior, such as tax evasion. In this regard, hours of work still constitute an interesting benchmark. We
also leave aside the macroeconomic literature, in which elasticities are often obtained through calibration
of general equilibrium models, and are usually much larger than in microeconomic studies (e.g. Prescott,
2004). However, macro estimates can however be reconciled with micro ones when using life cycle models
with human capital accumulation (Keane and Rogerson, 2012). Our study also relates to the recent attempts
to explain labor supply di¤erences across countries, initiated by Prescott, 2004 (see Blundell et al., 2011,
for a recent statement and additional references). While Prescott (2004) and several related studies ignore
di¤erences between the US and Europe (and among European countries themselves) in preference/culture,
we precisely aim at using micro-data to characterize international di¤erences in elasticities and the likely
role of country-specic preferences.
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Our estimations are conducted on 25 representative micro-datasets covering 18 countries
and two years of data for 7 countries. The datasets cover a relatively short time period
(1998-2005), which facilitates cross-country comparison. We provide detailed estimates of
own-wage elasticities for single individuals and individuals in couples, cross-wage elasticities
for couples, and income elasticities for all groups. We analyze the distribution of elasticities
across income groups and decompose labor supply responses between intensive and extensive
margins. Using a exible random utility model admittedly renders our results immune to
the risk of a systematic bias caused by restrictive assumptions on preferences. Nonetheless,
we check whether elasticities vary with the form of the utility function, the way we introduce
additional exibility (xed costs or mass points on certain part-time options) or the hour
choice set (from 4 choices to a much ner discretization closer to a continuous model). The
complete analysis is based on 9 di¤erent specications, 3 demographic groups and 25 di¤erent
countriesperiods; hence, a total of 675 maximum likelihood (ML) estimations.
Our results show that own-wage elasticities, both compensated and uncompensated, are rel-
atively small and much tighter across countries than suggested by results in the literature.
In particular, estimates for married women lie in a narrow range between :2 and :6, with
signicantly larger elasticities obtained for countries in which female participation is lower
(Greece, Spain, Ireland). Elasticities for married men, expectedly smaller, are even more
concentrated, while elasticities for single individuals show substantial variation with income
levels. Consistent results are also found across countries, with important implications for
welfare and optimal tax analysis: the extensive margin systematically dominates the inten-
sive margin; for single individuals, this contributes to larger elasticities in low income groups
in most countries; income elasticities are extremely small. The one area where di¤erences
remain concerns the cross-wage e¤ects, consistent with substitution in spouseshousehold
production in Western Europe and complementarity in their leisure in the US. Using a
decomposition analysis, we rule out di¤erences in tax policy, wage/hours levels and demo-
graphics as explanations for cross-country di¤erences in labor supply responses. Accordingly,
our results are consistent with Western countries having genuinely di¤erent individual and
social preferences, e.g. di¤erent preferences for work and childcare institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the empirical approach. The
main results are reported in Section 3 while the decomposition analysis is presented in Section
4. Section 5 concludes and derives important implications for research on tax policy.
2 A Common Empirical Approach
The principal object of examination in this study is the size of wage and income elastic-
ities, which are standard representations of labor supply responsiveness and particularly
convenient in terms of conducting international comparisons. While the ideal methodologi-
cal situation would be to use a generally agreed-upon standard estimation approach, there
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is no such consensus on this matter. We have opted for the estimation of discrete choice
models. This approach is based on the concept of random utility maximization (see van
Soest, 1995, or Hoynes, 1996, among others), which requires the explicit parameterization of
consumption-leisure preferences, for utility to be evaluated at each discrete alternative. It
is not necessary to impose tangency conditions, and in principle the model is very general.6
Labor supply decisions are reduced to choosing among a discrete set of possibilities, e.g.
inactivity, part-time and full-time. In this way, both extensive and intensive margins are di-
rectly estimated; the complete e¤ect of the tax-benet system is easily accounted for, even in
the presence of nonconvexities in budget sets; work costs, which also create nonconvexities,
and joint decisions in couples are dealt with in a relatively straightforward manner.
Our methodological choice was guided by two considerations, the rst of which involved
the need to conduct consistent comparisons across many countries. The only realistic way
of doing so was to estimate the same structural, discrete choice model separately for each
country, which compels with our attempt to net out all methodological di¤erences that hinder
international comparison. The second key issue is the identication of behavioral parameters,
with the main problem that unobserved characteristics (e.g. being a hard-working person)
may inuence both wages and work preferences to potentially bias estimates obtained from
cross-sectional wage variation across individuals. In the Hausman (1981) approach, which
relies on regressions of hours of work on the after-tax wage and virtual income, the validity
of the instrumental variable estimator hinges on whether the exclusion assumptions of the
economic model hold.7 Therefore, a preferred approach consists of using policy changes
to directly identify responses to exogenous variation in net wages. One may rely on a
particular tax reform (cf. Eissa and Hoynes, 2004, among others) or long-term variations
(Blundell et al., 1998, Devereux, 2004).8 In our approach, identication is mainly provided
by nonlinearities, nonconvexities and discontinuities in the budget constraint due to the tax-
benet rules of each country. Closer to the natural experiment method, some exogenous
variation also stems from spatial and time variations in these rules, as discussed below.
2.1 Model and Identication
Model Specication. We opt for a exible discrete choice model, as used in well-known
contributions for Europe (van Soest, 1995, Blundell et al., 2000) or the US (Hoynes, 1996,
6In practice, specic utility functions are used. In Section 4.3, we check whether the degree of exibility
or moving closer to the continuous case a¤ect the estimated elasticities (see also Heim, 2009, for a model
combining continuous and discrete dimensions).
7Estimates are also potentially contaminated by measurement errors (the division bias, cf. Ziliak and
Kniesner, 1999).
8For the former approach, we would need signicant policy reforms (and ideally a common one) for many
countries, with all occurring around the same time period. Meanwhile, the latter approach would require
using panel data or many repeated cross sections for a large number of countries. However, either case
seems hardly feasible. As noted by Imbens (2010), there are many important research question for which no
experimental or quasi-experimental set-up is available, of which our large-scale comparison is one.
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Keane andMo¢ tt, 1998). We refer to these studies for more technical details, simply present-
ing the main aspects of the modeling strategy. In our baseline, we specify consumption-leisure
preferences using a quadratic utility function with xed costs. Accordingly, the deterministic
utility of a couple i at each discrete choice j = 1; :::; J can be written as:
Uij = ciCij + ccC
2
ij + hf iH
f
ij + hmiH
m
ij + hff (H
f
ij)
2 + hmm(H
m
ij )
2 (1)
+chfCijH
f
ij + chmCijH
m
ij + hmhfH
f
ijH
m
ij   fj  1(Hfij > 0)  mj  1(Hmij > 0)
with household consumption Cij and spouseswork hours H
f
ij and H
m
ij . The J choices for a
couple correspond to all combinations of the spousesdiscrete hours (for singles, the model
above is simplied to only one hour term Hij, and J is simply the number of discrete hour
choices for this person). Coe¢ cients on consumption and work hours are specied as:
ci = 
0
c + Z
c
ic + ui
hf i = 
0
hf
+ Zfi hf
hmi = 
0
hm + Z
m
i hm ;
i.e. they vary linearly with several taste-shifters Zi (including polynomial form of age, pres-
ence of children or dependent elders and region). The term ci also incorporates unobserved
heterogeneity, in the form of a normally-distributed term ui, for the model to allow random
taste variation and unrestricted substitution patterns between alternatives. The normality
assumption is mainly made for convenience, and in principle could be replaced by a more
exible distribution (for instance, a discrete distribution with a nite number of mass points,
cf. Hoynes, 1996). The t of the model is improved by the introduction of xed costs of
work, estimated as model parameters as in Callan et al. (2009) or Blundell et al. (2000).
Fixed costs explain that there are very few observations with a small positive number of
worked hours. These costs, denoted kj for k = f;m, are non-zero for positive hour choices
and depend on observed characteristics (e.g. the presence of young children).
As discussed above, this approach allows us to impose very few constraints on the model.
In fact, there is nothing to impose in terms of leisure (see van Soest et al., 2002), which is
all the more so given that xed costs are only parametrically identied, i.e. a very exible
utility function could pick up the gap in the distribution at few hours. Furthermore, work
may not be a source of disutility, as in textbook models, if staying at home is seen as a
depressing activity; namely, xed costs of work could be negative for some people. Hence,
we do not attempt to interpret them literally, i.e. as an income deator, rather expressing
them in utility metric. They may also pick up other, non-monetary xed costs of work or
account for international di¤erences in institutional settings that are not explicitly modeled,
e.g. di¤erences in childcare support in the form of subsidies or free childcare at school.9
9Note that we refrain from estimating childcare jointly with labor supply. This is not undertaken system-
atically in the literature, owing to data limitations (notably the availability and market price of childcare,
which can vary locally and with individual circumstances). However, some studies suggest joint estimations,
see, e.g. the survey by Blau and Tekin (2007).
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The only restriction to our model is the imposition of increasing monotonicity in consump-
tion, which seems a minimum consistency requirement for meaningful interpretation and
policy analysis. Positive marginal utility of consumption is directly imposed as a constraint
in the likelihood maximization.10 The potential restrictions due to the choice of this func-
tional form are examined in Section 3.4.
For each labor supply choice j, disposable income (equivalent to consumption in the present
static framework) is calculated as a function
Cij = d(w
f
iH
f
ij; w
m
i H
m
ij ; yi; Xi) (2)
of female and male earnings, non-labor income yi and household characteristics Xi. The tax-
benet function d is simulated using calculators that we present in the next section. In the
discrete choice approach, disposable income only needs to be assessed at certain points of the
budget curve. Male and female wage rates wfi and w
m
i for each household i are calculated by
dividing earnings by standardized work hours, rather than actual hours, in order to reduce
the so-called division bias. We estimate a standard Heckman-corrected wage equation to
predict wages. To further reduce the division bias, we predict wages for all observations,
rather than only for non-workers. The two-stage procedure, namely rst estimating wage
rates and subsequently using them in the labor supply estimation, is common practice (see
Creedy and Kalb, 2005).11 However, ignoring the wage prediction errors in a nonlinear labor
supply model would lead to inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters. We take
these error terms explicitly into account in the labor supply estimations, assuming that they
are normally distributed and following van Soest (1995).
The stochastic specication of the labor supply model is completed by i.i.d. error terms ij
for each choice j = 1; :::; J . That is, total utility at each alternative is written
Vij = Uij + ij
with Uij dened in expression (1). Error terms are assumed to represent possible obser-
vational errors, optimization errors or transitory situations. Assuming that they follow an
10This is achieved by choosing the smallest Lagrangian multiplier that reaches the target, i.e. at least 95%
of the observations with no negative marginal utility of income at all potential labor supply choices. The
remaining observations, less than 5% of the samples, are simply discarded before we calculate elasticities.
In practice, we obtain very small left-over, as a target of more than 99% is achieved for most countries and
demographic groups (detailed results are available from the authors). We also check quasi-concavity of the
utility function a posteriori, which is veried for all observations that pass the positive marginal utility of
income requirement.
11There are actually few studies adopting simultaneous estimations of wages and labor supply (e.g. van
Soest et al., 2002), given that tax-benet simulations must be run at each iteration of the ML estimation.
This is not possible in our case given the fact that EUROMOD is not programmed with an econometric
software. Moreover, approximations relying on a pre-simulated set of disposable income for a whole range
of wage values for each individual would be too time consuming, given the large number of countries.
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extreme value type I (EV-I) distribution, the (conditional) probability for each household i
of choosing a given alternative j has an explicit analytical solution:
Pij = exp(Uij)=
JX
k=1
exp(Uik): (3)
The unconditional probability is obtained by integrating out the two disturbance terms, i.e.
preference unobserved heterogeneity and the wage error term, in the likelihood. In practice,
this is achieved by averaging the conditional probability Pij over a large number of draws
for these terms, so the parameters can be estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. We
proceed with simulated ML yet rely on Halton draws of these residuals.12
Identication. The model accounts for the comprehensive e¤ect of tax-benet policies on
household budgets, with nonlinearities and discontinuities from tax-benet rules providing
a usual source of identication to models estimated on cross-sectional data (see van Soest,
2005, Blundell et al. 2000). Precisely, individuals with the same gross wage usually receive
di¤erent net wages. Indeed, given that they are characterized by di¤erent circumstances Xi
(di¤erent marital status, age, family compositions, home-ownership status, disability status)
or levels of non-labor income yi, their e¤ective tax schedules are di¤erent, i.e., di¤erent actual
marginal tax rates or benet withdrawal rates.13
In addition, regional variation in tax-benet rules generates additional exogenous variation,
and can be identied in our data and policy simulations for many countries. For the US,
variation across states in income tax and EITC is a well-known source of variation (see Eissa
and Hoynes, 2004, or Hoynes, 1996). For EUmember states, local variation in housing benet
rules can be identied for some countries in our samples/simulations (for instance, variations
across "départements" in France or municipalities in Finland). In Estonia, Hungary and
Poland, local governments provide di¤erent supplements to almost all benets, including
child benets/allowances and social assistance. For Germany and Italy, regional variation
in benet rules also exists and is accounted for. Nordic countries operate national and local
income taxation, which we account for in the case of Sweden and Finland (with municipal
at tax rates varying from 16   21% in Finland and 29   36% in Sweden). In the UK, the
council tax varies between the four main regions. Local taxes on dwelling vary with Belgian
regions. Regional variations in church tax rates are signicant in Finland and Germany,
while social insurance contributions can vary by region (e.g. in Germany).14
12Halton sequences generate quasi random draws that provide a more systematic coverage of the domain
of integration than independent random draws. Train (2003) explains that the accuracy can be markedly
increased in the context of mixed logit models. Following Train, we use r = 100 draws from Halton sequences.
13Arguably, some of these characteristics are included in Zi and also a¤ect preferences, so the model is only
parametrically identied. In practice, tax-benet rules depend on characteristics Xi, which are much more
detailed than usual taste-shifters Zi. For instance, benet rules depend on the detailed age of all children in
the household, on more detailed geographical information, etc.
14However, detailed information on regions is missing for Spain, Denmark, Austria and Portugal (countries
7
Finally, we can avail of two years of data for seven countries. The three-year interval between
the two corresponding tax-benet systems, 1998 and 2001, covers a period of time where
signicant tax-benet reforms took place. We discuss and explore this additional source of
exogenous variation in Section 4.3.
Elasticities. While labor supply elasticities cannot be derived analytically in the present
nonlinear model, they can be calculated by numerical simulations using the estimated model.
For wage (income) elasticities, we simply predict the change in average work hours and
participation rates following a marginal uniform increase in wage rates (non-labor income).
We have checked that results are similar when wage elasticities are calculated by simulating
either a 1% or a 10% increase in gross wages (unearned incomes). For income elasticities,
we give a marginal amount of capital income to households with zero capital income in
order to include them in the calculation. For couples, cross-wage elasticities are obtained
by simulating changes in female (male) hours when male (female) wage rates are increased.
Standard errors are obtained by repeated random draws of the model parameters from their
estimated distributions and recalculating elasticities for each draw.
2.2 Data, Selection and Tax-Benet Simulations
Data and Selection. We focus on the US, the EU-15 member states (except Luxem-
bourg) and three new member states (NMS), namely Estonia, Hungary and Poland.15 For
each country, we draw f information about incomes and demographics that can be used
for detailed tax-benet simulations and labor supply estimations from standard household
surveys (data sources are specied in Appendix A). For the EU-15, the datasets have been
assembled within the framework of the EUROMOD project (see Sutherland, 2007) and com-
bined with tax-benet simulations for 1998, 2001 or both. For the NMS, was were collected
for 2005, and policies simulated for that year, in a more recent development of the EURO-
MOD project.16 For the US, we use the 2006 Current Population Survey (IPUMS-CPS),
which contains information for 2005. Datasets have been harmonized within the EURO-
MOD project, in the sense that similar income concepts are used together with comparable
variable denitions (e.g. for education). We explain this in more detail in Appendix A and,
for the wage estimation, in Appendix B estimations: couples, single men and women (which
include single mothers). We only retain households where adults are aged between 18 and
for which we use the ECHP data), as well as the Netherlands.
15In the result tables, we use the o¢ cial country acronyms as follows: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE),
Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (SP), United Kingdom (UK), Sweden (SW), Estonia (EE), Hungary
(HU), Poland (PL), United States (US).
16We make use of policy/data years available in EUROMOD at the time of writing (1998, 2001 or 2005,
as indicated above), while its future developments should enable extending our results to more the recent
period and more countries.
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59, available for the labor market (not disabled, retired or in education) and we also exclude
self-employed, farmers and "extreme" situations, including very large families and those who
report implausibly high levels of working hours.
Tax-benet Simulations. For each discrete choice j and each household i, disposable
income Cij is obtained by aggregating all sources of household income and calculating benets
received and taxes and social contributions paid. We cover all direct taxes (labor and capital
income taxes), social security contributions, family and social transfers. These tax-benet
calculations, represented by function d() in expression (2), are performed using tax-benet
simulators together with information on income and socio-demographics Xi (for instance,
the children composition a¤ecting benet payments), as previously indicated. For Europe,
we use EUROMOD, a calculator designed to simulate the redistributive systems of all the
EU-15 countries and of some of the NMS, which includes simulation of all direct taxes,
payroll tax (social security contributions), social and family benets. An introduction to
EUROMOD, a descriptive analysis of taxes and transfers in the EU and robustness checks
is provided by Sutherland (2007). EUROMOD has been used in several empirical studies,
notably in the comparison of European welfare regimes by Immervoll et al. (2007, 2011).
For the US, calculations of direct taxes, contributions and tax credits (EITC) are conducted
using TAXSIM (version v9), the NBER calculator presented in Feenberg and Coutts (1993),
augmented by simulations of social transfers (TANF, Food Stamp). Tax-benet simulations
for the US are used in combination with CPS data in several applications (e.g. Eissa et
al., 2008).17 We assume full benet take-up and tax compliance. More rened estimations
accounting for the stigma of welfare program participation, as e.g. in Keane and Mo¢ tt
(1998) or Blundell et al.(2000), would require precise data information on The actual receipt
of benets, which is not always available or reliable in interview-based surveys. Chan (2013)
has recently suggested an extension of Keane and Mo¢ tt (1998) to a dynamic discrete-choice
model of labor supply with welfare participation as well as time limits and work requirements.
While these features are important in the US context, they are less so for European countries.
Statistics. Descriptive statistics of the selected samples are presented in Appendix A. For
married women, mean worked hours show considerable variation across countries, which is
essentially due to lower labor market participation in Southern countries (with the noticeable
exception of Portugal), Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Austria and Poland. While the
correlation between mean hours and participation rates is :92, there is some variation in
work hours among participants, with shorter work duration in Austria, Germany, Ireland, the
Netherlands and the UK. The participation of single women is lower in Ireland and the UK
due to the larger frequency of single mothers (the average number of children among single
17Information on tax-benet rules for each EU country is available at:
www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod together with modeling choices and validation of EUROMOD. For
the US, tax-benet rules and TAXSIM are presented in detail at www.nber.org/~taxsim/.
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women is highest in these two countries and Poland). There is much less variation for men,
with the main notable fact being a lower participation rate for single compared to married
men. Moreover, the variation in wage rates and demographic composition across countries
is also noteworthy. In particular for married women, participation rates are correlated with
wage rates (corr = :36) and the number of children ( :61). Attached to these patterns,
there may be interesting di¤erences across countries in the responsiveness of labor supply to
wages and income, and we turn to this central issue in the next sections. In Appendix A, we
take a closer look at the distribution of actual worked hours. For men, this shows the strong
concentration of work hours around full time (35 44 hours per week) and non-participation.
There is more variation for women, particularly with the availability of part-time work in
some countries: a peak at 15-24 hours can be seen in Belgium or 25-34 hours in France, where
some rms o¤er a 3/4 of a full-time contract; while the Netherlands shows high concentration
in these two segments. The US is characterized by a particularly concentrated distribution,
around full-time and inactivity, and a relatively high rate of overtime. To accommodate
the particular hour distribution of each country while maintaining a comparable framework,
we suggest a baseline estimation using a 7-point discretization, i.e., J = 7 for singles and
J = 7 7 for couples, with choices from 0 to 60 hours/week (steps of 10 hours). Below, we
check the sensitivity of our results to alternative choice sets.
3 Results
While this section presents and discusses a large set of results regarding elasticities, before
doing so, we briey comment on the model estimation and how it ts the data.
3.1 Estimates and Goodness-of-Fit
Labor supply estimations are conducted for each country separately, yet with the same
specication (except the "region" variable, which is country-specic). Estimations are also
carried out for couples, single men and single women separately, with the results reported
in Appendix C. To summarize results concerning our model estimations, we can say that
parameter estimates are broadly in line with usual ndings. For instance, as expected, the
presence of children signicantly decreases the propensity to work for women, both in couples
and single mothers, in most countries. Taste shifters related to age are often signicant for
women in couples yet not systematically for other demographic groups. The constant of
the cost of work is signicantly positive for all groups, while the presence of young children
most often has a signicantly positive impact on the work cost of women. For single men
and women, higher education leads to lower costs, which can be interpreted as demand-side
constraints in the form of lower search costs (see van Soest et al., 2002). We cannot truly
directly compare preferences across countries, given the large number of model parameters.
While a simpler model would allow us to do so, for instance a LES specication, it would
10
certainly be too restrictive. Hence, we directly focus on the comparison of labor supply
elasticities in the next sub-section.
Log-likelihood and pseudo R2, reported with the estimates in Appendix C, convey that
the t is reasonably good: :31 on average for couples (:28 for singles), from :23 for the
UK to :45 for Poland (from :14 to :40 for singles). For couples, Table 1 shows that mean
predicted hours compare well with those observed, with the discrepancy less than 1% in
most cases. There are some exceptions, with larger discrepancies for women in Portugal,
Greece and Spain. For the two latter countries, we report the distribution of observed and
predicted frequencies for each choice underneath Table 1. We use a 4-choices model for the
ease of reading, reporting the 16 combinations (Hf ; Hm) for couples. We can see that the
option (40; 40) is slightly underestimated, while option (0; 40) is overpredicted. However,
the overall distributions of observed and predicted hours even compare relatively well for
these countries. For all countries, we have checked that satisfying comparisons at the mean
do not hide wrong hour distributions. As an illustration of this, we report two additional
graphs in cases where mean hours are correctly predicted (France and the Netherlands),
conrming that the underlying distributions of predicted and observed choices are also well
in line. Indeed, these same conclusions are obtained for the model with J = 7 choices.
For single individuals, mean predicted and observed hours compare well for many countries,
as shown in Table 2. However, the t is not as good as for couples, which is a typical
result in the literature (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).18 The discrepancy is less than 5% in
almost all cases. For three cases with the largest discrepancies (Belgian women 1998, Irish
men 1998 and Portuguese women 2001), we present the hour distributions underneath Table
2 (baseline situation with 7 choices). Di¤erences are generally due to bad predictions in
terms of participation, as is the case for Irish single men (Portuguese single women), where
non-participation is over(under)-predicted. It is also due to the model not being able to
reproduce the hours distribution for the workers well. This is the case for Belgian women,
for whom participation rates are well predicted yet part-time options are over-predicted at
the expense of full-time. This is also the case when the overall t is good, for instance in
the case of French men 2001 reported in our illustration.19 The overall conclusion is that the
model performs relatively well, which provides reassurance regarding the reliability of our
elasticity measures.
18Moreover, estimates are also slightly more precise for couples than for single Individuals, and both issues
may be due to less variation in labor market behavior among singles (with the exception of lone parents).
Furthermore, the model for couples generally ts the data better because inactivity is more of a voluntary
choice for married women than single individuals.
19In order to compare the within-sample t with out-of-sample predictions, we have also estimated the
baseline model on a random half of the sample for each country, subsequently using it to predict hours for
the other half. Fit measures on the holdout sample show similar results as those discussed in the text, thus
conveying that the exible model used does not overt the data in a way that would reduce external validity.
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Table 1: Predicted and Observed Mean Hours: Couples
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Female observed 16.8 24.0 24.3 29.5 32.0 23.1 23.2 19.6 20.7 13.3 11.0 17.5 15.5
predicted 17.3 24.2 24.2 29.1 31.3 22.9 23.2 19.6 21.1 12.6 10.7 17.2 15.4
gap % 2.6% 0.7% -0.1% -1.1% -2.3% -0.8% -0.2% -0.1% 2.0% -5.1% -2.7% -1.5% -1.0%
Male observed 40.3 39.0 39.4 38.3 37.5 38.2 37.0 35.3 35.6 37.9 31.9 36.7 36.0
predicted 40.5 38.1 38.5 38.4 37.0 38.1 37.0 35.6 35.6 37.6 31.3 36.2 36.5
gap % 0.4% -2.3% -2.5% 0.2% -1.3% -0.1% -0.2% 0.9% -0.1% -0.8% -1.9% -1.4% 1.4%
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Female observed 18.2 26.4 12.0 14.7 20.8 22.1 28.4 30.7 33.2 28.6 23.4 27.0
predicted 18.3 28.2 12.3 13.5 21.2 22.7 28.7 30.8 33.7 28.6 23.5 26.6
gap % 0.4% 7.0% 2.8% -7.8% 1.8% 3.1% 1.0% 0.3% 1.3% 0.2% 0.3% -1.3%
Male observed 39.2 39.6 36.8 38.9 37.1 37.1 35.8 37.1 35.9 37.4 33.3 41.1
predicted 39.1 39.8 36.3 38.2 37.6 37.9 36.2 37.2 36.4 37.3 33.3 40.9
gap % -0.2% 0.4% -1.4% -1.8% 1.3% 2.3% 1.2% 0.2% 1.4% -0.2% 0.3% -0.4%
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Table 2: Predicted and Observed Mean Hours: Singles
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Female observed 28.8 25.3 27.4 28.6 31.2 29.7 28.1 25.9 26.8 21.6 17.4 22.5 27.3
predicted 30.2 23.2 26.5 28.6 30.4 29.5 28.2 25.1 25.9 20.4 17.7 23.9 27.1
gap % 4.6% -8.4% -3.4% 0.2% -2.7% -0.4% 0.3% -2.9% -3.2% -5.9% 1.4% 6.0% -0.4%
Male observed 36.8 35.1 34.6 32.9 30.4 33.5 32.2 31.9 32.6 31.6 24.7 27.2 28.8
predicted 37.2 34.1 34.0 32.2 28.9 33.3 32.1 31.6 31.4 30.6 22.9 24.9 28.7
gap % 1.2% -2.9% -1.7% -2.0% -5.0% -0.5% -0.3% -0.7% -3.9% -3.0% -7.5% -8.4% -0.3%
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Female observed 25.1 28.2 26.1 27.4 20.0 22.2 25.8 29.8 33.4 33.4 26.2 32.7
predicted 25.9 29.8 25.6 28.4 20.3 22.6 25.9 29.5 33.2 33.2 26.3 32.7
gap % 3.2% 5.7% -2.0% 3.3% 1.5% 1.9% 0.3% -1.0% -0.5% -0.5% 0.4% -0.2%
Male observed 35.1 32.1 27.5 32.8 28.9 32.1 26.6 31.9 30.4 32.8 23.0 36.2
predicted 34.3 33.4 27.0 32.8 28.7 32.2 26.5 30.6 30.6 32.5 22.9 35.9
gap % -2.4% 4.0% -1.6% -0.1% -0.7% 0.2% -0.2% -3.9% 0.6% -1.0% -0.5% -0.9%
Ireland 2001 (men)
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3.2 The Size of Own-Wage Elasticities
Our main results on labor supply elasticities are illustrated in the graphs below, and are also
reported in the tables of Appendix D, which contain detailed own-wage hour elasticities,
compensated and uncompensated, overall and for quintiles of disposable income.20 We start
with own-wage elasticities, as reported in Figure 1.21
Results for Married Individuals. We rst focus on married women, the group mostly
studied in the literature. Total hour elasticities are to be found in a very narrow range
:2   :4 for several countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Nether-
lands), while they are slightly smaller, around :1   :2, yet signicantly di¤erent from zero
in France, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, the NMS, the UK and the US. Furthermore, they are
signicantly larger, between :4 and :6, in Ireland (1998), Greece and Spain. Accordingly,
our results show that elasticities are relatively modest and hold in a narrow interval, once
comparable datasets, selection and empirical strategies are used.22 However, estimates are
su¢ ciently precise so that di¤erences between the three aforementioned groups of countries
are statistically signicant. Over all countries and periods, the mean hour elasticity is :27
with a standard deviation of :16. The simple intuition that elasticities are larger when female
participation is lower is broadly conrmed by the data, i.e., the cross-country correlation be-
tween mean wage hour (participation) elasticities and mean worked hours (participation
rates) is around  0:81 ( 0:84). In Tables D.1-D.2, we show that elasticities are only slightly
larger for women with children. They are signicantly larger in a few countries and notably
in the high-elasticity group (Greece, Spain and Ireland 1998).23 For married men, results
are even more compressed, with own-wage elasticities usually ranging between around :05
20For the sake of a clear exposition, the graphs focus on the most recent year when two years are available.
Appendix tables report detailed estimates for both years, based on separate estimations for each year. As
we show below, preferences are relatively stable over the 3-year interval considered in this case.
21We focus on uncompensated elasticities. As reported in Appendix Tables D.1-D.8, compensated own
wage elasticities are only slightly larger than uncompensated ones in most cases, owing to very small and neg-
ative income elasticities, as discussed below. They are slightly smaller in rare cases where income elasticities
are positive, e.g. single women in Denmark.
22When compared with the survey estimates in Bargain and Peichl (2013), we see that our estimates
are very close to, or not statistically di¤erent from, past ndings for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany,
Sweden and the UK. However, our estimates are smaller or close to the lower bound of past condence
intervals for Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, which could be explained, among other things, by the use
of older data in previous studies (e.g. in papers by van Soest and co-authors). Our estimates for the US
are very small and compare well to the most recent results (Blau and Kahn, 2007, Heim, 2007). US studies
that report larger elasticities rely on older data, while it has been shown that elasticities have dramatically
decreased over time in this country.
23Appendix Table A.1 shows that the number of couples with children is large in Ireland yet close to
average in Greece and Spain. Hence, higher elasticities among married women in these countries do not
seem to be driven by a higher proportion of families with children. This is conrmed by the decomposition
analysis in the last section.
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Figure 1: Own-wage Elasticities: Total Hours
and :15 (see Figure 1). Over all countries/periods, the mean hour elasticity is :10, with a
standard deviation of :05. Estimates are precise enough to nd statistical di¤erences across
some countries, yet are less pronounced than for women. The correlation between elasticities
and worked hours (participation) is around  0:41 ( 0:64). Compared to some of the older
literature, we nd total hour elasticities that are signicantly larger than zero. However, as
discussed below, pure intensive margin elasticities are very close to zero.
Results for Single Individuals. While there are numerous studies on the labor supply
of single mothers in the UK and the US, by contrast, and despite the large increase in the
number of childless single individuals over the last few decades, the labor supply behavior of
single women and men has received relatively little attention. The main reason is probably
that most of the policy reforms used to estimate labor supply responses in the US and the UK
concerned families with children. In this way, the present study adds valuable information
to the literature by providing new estimates for all three groups and many countries. As
seen in Figure 1, elasticities for single men show a little more variation than for married
men, usually in a range between 0 and :4. They are signicantly di¤erent from zero in most
cases, with some exceptions. Overall, estimates are slightly larger than for married men,
which is in line with lower participation rates and attachment to the labor market among
young single individuals. This is particularly the case in Spain and Ireland, where estimates
15
are signicantly larger than in other countries. The number of single men with children is
marginal and we do not need to discuss it. We observe some variation among single women
(mean estimates for the pooled childless women and single mothers), usually between :1 and
:5 with larger elasticities for some countries (around :6   :7 in Belgium and Italy). Single
mothers tend to have larger elasticities than childless women, yet di¤erences are usually
not signicant (with notable exceptions of Greece and Ireland).24 The correlation between
elasticities and worked hours (participation) among single individuals is usually smaller than
for couples:  :50 ( :50) for women and  :32 for men ( :46).
3.3 International Comparisons
We have established that international di¤erences in the magnitude of wage elasticities are
modest once comparable datasets, selection and a common empirical approach are used.
This is an interesting result, given the substantial di¤erences across countries in terms of
labor market conditions, institutions and preferences/culture. Nonetheless, we have found
signicant di¤erences between broad groups of countries, as discussed above, which we in-
vestigate more thoroughly in Section 4. We now focus on interesting regularities and salient
di¤erences between countries.
Extensive versus Intensive Margins. In Figure 2, we decompose total hour elasticities
(i.e. changes in total work hours due to a marginal wage increase) into hour changes among
workers (intensive margin) and hour changes due to participation responses (extensive mar-
gin), and clearly see that most of the response is driven by the extensive margin. This result
is important for tax and welfare analyses, as motivated in the introduction. The literature
has documented this for a few countries (see Heckman, 1993, for the US, and Bargain and
Peichl, 2013, for many countries).25 However, our results show that this pattern holds almost
systematically across many Western countries and for all demographic groups. Even in the
rare situations where the intensive margin is non-zero, the extensive margin is larger (e.g. for
Dutch married women). For singles, largest participation responses come from low income
groups, as discussed in further detail below.
24Drawing from the survey in Bargain and Peichl (2013), it is evident that our results are broadly in
line with the available estimates for the Netherlands or Germany, while several studies report comparable
estimates to ours for the UK (Blundell et al., 1992) and the US (Dickert et al., 1995). However, our results
point to more moderate elasticities than in Keane and Mo¢ tt (1998) for the US, or for several British studies.
This is possibly due to the fact that we cover a more recent time period, which implies methodological
di¤erences, and that this group has become relatively larger over time (hence, less negatively selected in
terms of labor market participation). Indeed, Bishop et al. (2009) report small elasticities for single women
over 1979-2003, at least compared to married women, and a signicant decline in wage elasticities over the
period.
25For the US, Heim (2009) nds the intensive margin to be larger than the extensive one. We conrm this
for the upper half of the distribution for married men hereafter. Chetty (2012) explains that responses at
the intensive margin, due to potential optimization frictions, may not be detected by standard approaches.
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Figure 2: Own-wage Elasticities: Intensive versus Extensive Margins
The intensive elasticities are extremely small for all countries and all demographic groups,
for example, lower than :08 for married women in all countries (except the Netherlands).
Intensive margin elasticities are sometimes negative for men in couples (e.g. in the UK),
single men (e.g. Belgium, Portugal and Ireland 1998) and single women (Denmark). Small
responses at the intensive margin are mainly due to the few possibilities of working part-time
in most countries. Among exceptions where responses are signicant, the extreme case is
married women in the Netherlands, with an intensive margin representing almost half of
the response. We conjecture that this is due to the outstanding role of part-time work in
this country and the possibility of adjusting labor supply along this margin (on average,
around 25% of prime-age working women work part-time in the OECD, while this is around
50% in the Netherlands; cf. Table A.2 and the discussion in the data section). Supply-side
interpretation of hour restrictions, e.g. in terms of job search, are discussed in the robustness
checks below and the concluding section.
Distribution of Own-wage Elasticities by Income Groups. In the tables of Appen-
dix D, we provide the distribution of own-wage elasticities of total hours by quintiles of the
income distribution (with quintiles dened for couples and singles separately). This infor-
mation is represented graphically in Figure 3, with a box-plot showing the cross-country
dispersion for each quintile. In Figure 4, we show the detailed distribution of elasticities
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Figure 3: Wage Elasticities by Income Quintile (box plots over all countries)
across quintiles, separately for each country. The rst striking result is that there is much
more variation than when only considering mean elasticities. For all groups except mar-
ried men, elasticities for some income quintiles can go up to 1. More precisely, for single
individuals, the distribution of elasticities across income groups shows a clearly decreasing
pattern, with largest elasticities for lower quintiles. The fact that elasticities may be very
heterogeneous across di¤erent earning groups and that participation elasticities can be sig-
nicantly larger at the bottom of the distribution is crucial for welfare analysis (cf., Eissa
et al., 2008, Saez, 2001). However, very few studies report this kind of information.26 Our
results generalize it, and show that participation elasticities indeed drive the large responses
in lower quintiles for single individuals.
Results for married women do not show such a pattern, in fact pointing to larger elasticities
at the top, while Eissa (1995) nds similar results for the US. This is consistent with the
added worker theory (see Blundell et al., 2012), namely that women in poor households must
complete family income, while the labor supply of those in wealthier families is sensitive to
26The rare exceptions, Meghir and Phillips (2008) for the UK and Aaberge et al. (2002) for Italy, indicate
that low-educated single men signicantly respond to nancial incentives. The former study reports a
participation wage elasticity of :27 for unskilled single men and zero for those with college education, while
the latter reports participation elasticities as high as :5 for single men in the lower part of the income
distribution and almost zero higher up.
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nancial incentives. For married men, our results show a at or decreasing pattern, closer to
that of singles, although there are some exceptions (i.e. an increasing pattern in France, Italy,
Spain and the UK). Results are usually not driven by a decreasing intensive margin, but,
again, rather by the participation margin. In fact, for some countries like the US, elasticities
decrease with income along the extensive margin, while the intensive margin (the di¤erence
between total and extensive e¤ects in Figure 4) seems to increase with income. This is in
line with the elasticity of taxable income literature, which reports more responses at the top
(admittedly due to margins not accounted for here, yet also to more adjustment possibilities
for top earners). Other countries (e.g. the UK) show intensive elasticities becoming negative
for higher incomes, more in line with backward-bending labor supply curves.
Cross-wage Elasticities. Perhaps the most interesting di¤erence across countries is the
measure of cross-wage elasticities within couples, with estimates of uncompensated elastic-
ities plotted with condence intervals in the left hand side graph of Figure 5 and reported
in the tables of D. While these are usually negative and smaller in absolute value than
own-wage elasticities, they are nonetheless sizeable for women in some countries, including
Austria, Denmark, Germany and Ireland, which is not an unusual result (see, e.g. Callan
et al., 2009). Cross-wage elasticities are much smaller (in absolute terms) for men, between
 :05 and 0 in most countries. Income e¤ects being small, compensated cross-wage elastic-
ities are close to uncompensated ones. We plot compensated elasticities for both men and
women on the right hand side graph of Figure 5, in order to easily check the complemen-
tarity or substitution between spousesnon-market time. With su¢ cient complementarity,
a decrease in the male (female) wage must decrease both male and female non-market time,
i.e. cross-wage elasticities are positive. Interestingly, this situation seems to characterize the
US (elasticities are small but signicant). It sounds reasonable that spouses enjoy spending
time together, and all the more so as free time is relatively more scarce than in Europe and
more likely to coincide with pure leisure. An alternative explanation could be higher assor-
tative mating on productivity levels (compared to Europe). However, recent evidence in an
intertemporal framework by Blundell et al. (2012) tends to support the former explanation.
By contrast, our results point to substituability between male and female non-market time
in most European countries. This is consistent with, yet not exclusively explained by, the
fact that non-market time of European couples is more often associated with household pro-
duction (see Freeman and Schettkat, 2005), for which male and female non-market time can
be considered a substitute. Four countries show an apparently asymmetrical situation. In
fact, only the female cross-wage elasticity is positive in Poland and Hungary (male elasticity
is not signicantly di¤erent from zero). For Spain 2001 and Italy, cross-wage elasticities are
negative for men and positive for women (a similar result exists for low income groups in
Aaberge et al., 2002), yet female elasticities are not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
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Figure 4: Wage Elasticities by Income Quintile
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Figure 5: Cross-wage Elasticities
Income Elasticities. Income elasticities are plotted in Figure 6 and reported in the tables
of Appendix D.27 As often in the labor supply literature, income elasticities are very close to
zero and negative for a majority of countries (cf., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; insignicant
income e¤ects are also found in the literature on taxable income elasticities, cf., Saez et
al., 2012). They are positive for some countries, yet rarely signicant in this case, with the
main exceptions being Finland and Sweden. Despite being at odds with theory, positive
income elasticities are encountered in other papers (including two studies for Finland and
Sweden, as discussed in Bargain and Peichl, 2013, plus van Soest, 1995, for the Netherlands
and Blau and Kahn, 2007 for the US, among others).28 Considering the estimates more
closely, we nd that this result is driven by singles without children, located in the lowest
income quintiles and responding along the participation margin. The tting explanation is
thatNordic countries are characterized by stricter asset-tests for social assistance than other
EU countries (cf. Eardley et al. 1996). Hence, cross-sectional variation may capture the fact
27Data provides information on property income and investment income. However, given the many ze-
ros, we increase non-labor income by a marginal amount for all observations in order to compute income
elasticities over all observations (bottom-coding).
28Substituability between time and money inputs in household production may explain this result. Indeed,
an income e¤ect may not only increase leisure (a normal good) but also decrease housework, and could
eventually increase labor supply if the latter e¤ect dominates. However, this seems to apply less to singles
than to married individuals with children.
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that those among the least productive singles in Nordic countries with non-labor income are
more likely to work, given that they are not eligible for welfare.
Finally, let us make a few remarks. First, the literature on optimal taxation usually assumes
income e¤ects to be zero in order to simplify the derivation of optimal tax rules (see for
instance Saez, 2001): our results tend to support this assumption. Second, one might ask
"what is small?". For comparison, own-wage elasticities for women are computed with a
1% wage increment that corresponds, in additional weekly income, to between 2 and 15
times (across countries, on average) the increment in weekly non-labor income used for
income elasticity calculation. Third, for couples, male and female income elasticities are
very similar (this is not directly visible from the graphs), although exceptions include Italy,
Spain and France. When ignoring Italy, where male income elasticities are very negative,
the correlation between married men and womens income elasticities is :79.
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Figure 6: Income Elasticities
3.4 Sensitivity Checks
We suggest an extensive sensitivity analysis, focusing on married women, i.e. the main group
studied in the recent literature.
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Improving Identication: Policy Reforms. As previously discussed, identication is
often improved by pooling several years of data in order to exploit exogenous variation in net
wages stemming from policy reforms. For seven countries, we have two years of data at our
disposal, 1998 and 2001. Indeed, the three-year interval coincides with signicant reforms in
these countries, including tax credit reforms in the UK (1999), France and Belgium (2001),
signicant changes in income tax schedules in Germany, Spain and Ireland, and several
changes in transfers. A very detailed review of these policy changes is suggested in Appendix
E. We re-estimate the labor supply model for each country by pooling the two years of data
and assuming stable preferences over the period, with results plotted in Figure 7 and reported
in Appendix Table E.1. The important point is that the overall picture does not change.
For 11 of the 14 countryyear observations, results are essentially unchanged compared to
baseline estimates. However, for France 1998 and Spain 1998, elasticities are now smaller
and more similar to those of 2001, conrming that France (Spain) is placed in the group of
countries with low (high) elasticities. For Ireland 2001, the elasticity is now more similar to
the 1998 estimate, placing this country in the high-elasticity group.
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Figure 7: Pooling Years to Improve Identication
Specication Check. We have argued that models with discrete choices are very general,
given that they do not require imposing much constraint on preferences and allow accounting
for complete tax-benet policies a¤ecting household budgets. Nonetheless, as discussed in
Section 2, we may check whether our estimates are sensitive to several crucial aspects of the
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model specication. Results of these extensive robustness checks are provided in Appendix
Table E.2. The rst row of each panel in this table corresponds to the baseline, namely a
7-choice model with quadratic utility and xed costs, whereby elasticities are obtained by
averaging expected hours over all observations (frequency method).
Firstly, results are not sensitive to the way that we calculate elasticities (i.e. frequency versus
calibration methods, see discussion in Appendix E). Secondly, and more importantly, we
check whether the main restriction of the model plays a role, i.e. the fact that the choice
set is discretized. The fourth and fth rows of each panel in Table E.2 report elasticities
when alternative choice sets are used, namely a discretization with 4  and 13 hour choices.
The model with J = 4 choices for singles (4  4 = 16 for couples) essentially captures the
commonly-agreed durations of work: non-participation (0), part-time (20), full-time (40)
and overtime (50 hours/week). However, such a model does not adapt particularly well to
the hour distribution of each country. The narrower discretization with 13 choices, from 0
to 60 hours/week with a step of 5 hours, and 13  13 = 169 combinations for couples, is
more computationally demanding. However, it may pick up more country-specic peaks in
hour distributions and, in fact, makes it closer to a continuous model. Interestingly, Table
E.2 shows that results are very similar in all three cases (J = 4; 7 and 13), with only slightly
larger elasticities observed in the 4-point case for some countries (e.g. Belgium and Ireland).
Finally, we check whether elasticities are sensitive to the functional form. Similar to van Soest
et al. (2002) for the Netherlands, we experiment alternative specications by increasing the
order of the polynomial in the utility function: quadratic (baseline) then cubic and quartic
(rows 6 and 7 of the panels in Table E.2). We also change the way exibility gained in
the model by replacing xed costs of work, as used in Blundell et al. (2000), by part-time
dummies (last rows in Table E.2). Precisely, we include dummies at the 10, 20 and 30
hour choices in the 7-choice model, as used in van Soest (1995). These parameters may be
interpreted as job search costs for less common working hours, and hence include some of
the labor market restrictions on the choice set.29 Results for these di¤erent specications
are relatively stable: the size of elasticities hardly changes across the di¤erent modeling
choices.30 This result reinforces our main conclusions regarding international comparisons.
29The fact that some choices may not be available to some people due to institutional constraints or
individual/job characteristics can be modeled explicitly as a probability of choice availability in the log-
likelihood (see Aaberge et al., 1995, who also allow for di¤erent wage rates at each choice). Such a model
represents a di¤erent parameterization of the present one, where dummies for specic, possibly constrained
hours of work are used (van Soest, 1995). On hour restrictions, see the discussion in the concluding section.
30The only exception seems to be Italy, where higher order polynomial utility leads to larger elasticities.
The di¤erence with the baseline is only statistically signicant in the case of participation elasticities, and
partly disappears when we restrict the condition of participation to people working at least ve hours a
week when calculating elasticities (indeed, there are a number of initial non-working women for whom the
predicted number of weekly hours is very small after the wage increase used to calculate elasticities the
additional restriction is reasonable if we consider that it is unusual to observe such small values).
24
4 Assessing Cross-Country Di¤erences in Elasticity Size
The evidence presented above suggests that cross-country di¤erences in elasticities remain,
even after controlling for methodological di¤erences. Accordingly, we attempt to isolate
important factors explaining these di¤erences in this section. We still focus on married
women, mainly because this group shows the largest variation in elasticities across countries.
4.1 Wage and Labor Supply Levels
Hour and participation elasticities are strongly correlated with mean hours and participation
levels across countries. Here, we check that larger elasticities in countries such as Greece,
Ireland and Spain are not simply due to the hour and wage levels. Denote c = @Hc@wc
wc
Hc
the
hour elasticity for country c. We re-compute elasticities as Mc =
@Hc
@wc
w
H
, using the country-
specic responsiveness @Hc
@wc
while holding hour and wage at the mean levels H and w for
all countries (adjusted for PPP di¤erences in the case of wages). We focus on own-wage
elasticities of total hours, reporting the results in Figure 8. The upper left panel compares
elasticities in the baseline (circles) and in this "mean levels" scenario (triangles) together
with their 95% bootstrapped condence intervals. The two scenarios are plotted one against
the other in the upper right panel. We observe little di¤erence when holding wages and
hours constant, with the only exceptions being Estonia, Hungary and Portugal (the US),
which are pushed in the high (low) elasticity group under the mean level scenario. This is
clearly due to the the NMS and Portugal (the US) having signicant lower (higher) wage
rates while their female participation rates are somewhat close to the international average.
The lower left (right) panel represents the "mean hour" ("mean wage") scenario, where
only hours (wages) hold at the international mean value H (w). We see that high-elasticity
countries like Greece and Spain are not only characterized by lower female labor supply but
also by lower wage rates. However, these two e¤ects cancel each other, and consequently
these countries remain in the high-elasticity group under the total mean level scenario. The
main message of this exercise is that cross-country di¤erences are preserved when elasticities
are evaluated at mean values, and must therefore be explained by other factors.
4.2 Tax-benet Systems
The size of hour elasticities might be inuenced by di¤erences in tax-benet systems across
countries. Precisely, baseline elasticities are calculated by incrementing gross wages by 1%,
as is common in the literature. Accordingly, the fact that high tax countries are characterized
by smaller net wage increments could explain smaller elasticities. To check this point, we
simulate a 1% increase in the net wage in order to cancel out di¤erences in e¤ective marginal
tax rates (EMTR) across countries due to di¤erent tax schedules or benet withdrawal rates.
Figure 9 reports total hour elasticities in the baseline and this "net-wage increment" scenario.
The right panel plots the two situations, while the left panel additionally indicates the 95%
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Figure 8: E¤ect of Wage/Hour Levels on Wage-Elasticities of Total Hours (Married Women)
bootstrapped condence intervals. Elasticities after a 1% increase in net wage are generally
larger indeed a 1% change in gross wages corresponds to smaller increments due to taxation.
However, and most importantly, cross-country variation in elasticities is not truly a¤ected
when accounting for di¤erences in implicit taxation of labor income.
4.3 Demographic Characteristics
We nally turn to the role of demographic composition. As indicated in Section 3.2, im-
portant di¤erences exist across countries in this respect, notably concerning the number of
children yet also the age and education structure. Given that it is plausible that these demo-
graphic di¤erences a¤ect the size of mean elasticities, we decompose di¤erences in elasticities
across countries to investigate this point, using an approach similar to that in Heim (2007).
Let i denote a womans age cohort, j her education group and k the number of her children.31
Let ijk;c denote the wage elasticity of total hours for a woman of type ijk in country c. The
mean elasticity in this country, c, can be written as a weighted average
P
i
P
j
P
k
Pijk;cijk;c;
where Pijk;c denotes the proportion of women of type ijk in this country. This proportion
31In our application, we retain three age groups (aged 18-35, 36-45, and 45-59), two education groups and
three family sizes (no children, 1-2 children, 3 children or more). Rening with three education groups leads
to too many empty cells.
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Figure 9: E¤ect of Tax-benet Systems on Wage-Elasticities of Total Hours
can be re-written as Pijk;c = Pi;cPjji;cPkjij;c where Pi;c denotes the proportion of women in
age cohort i in country c, Pjji;c the proportion of women in education group j given mem-
bership in age cohort i, and Pkjij;c denotes the proportion of women with k children given
membership in age cohort i and education group j. Letting P denote the mean proportion
of a certain type over all countries, the proportion Pijk;c can be expressed as:
Pijk;c = P iP jjiP kjij +
 
Pi;c   P i

P jjiP kjij (4)
+Pi;c
 
Pjji;c   P jji

P kjij + Pi;cPjji;c
 
Pkjij;c   P kjij

:
This expression can be used to decompose the mean elasticity where ijk denotes the mean
elasticity for type ijk over all countries:
c =
 X
i
X
j
X
k
P iP jjiP kjijijk
!
+
 X
i
X
j
X
k
 
Pi;c   P i

P jjiP kjijijk
!
(5)
+
 X
i
X
j
X
k
Pi;c
 
Pjji;c   P jji

P kjijijk
!
+
 X
i
X
j
X
k
Pi;cPjji;c
 
Pkjij;c   P kjij

ijk
!
+
 X
i
X
j
X
k
Pi;cPjji;cPkjij;c (ijk;c   ijk)
!
:
The decomposition starts with the overall mean weighted elasticity, a term common to all
countries, while the next term denotes how elasticities vary due to the di¤erent composition
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of age cohorts, keeping the distributions of education and family size constant within an age
group. Keeping the distribution of the number of children within education levels constant,
the variation in elasticities due to di¤erent education levels is captured in the third compo-
nent. The fourth term indicates the di¤erence in elasticities due to di¤erent distributions
of family size, and the last component denotes the di¤erence in elasticities left explained
by di¤erent elasticities within an age-education-children cell, which can be interpreted as a
residual di¤erence due to factors other than composition e¤ects (for instance, di¤erences in
preferences). The results of this decomposition are presented in Figure 10. We show the
deviation of the country-specic elasticities from the mean elasticity that can be attributed
to di¤erences pertaining to each of the three demographic factors, as well as the residual,
unexplained di¤erence. It turns out that di¤erences in demographic composition regarding
age and education are never statistically signicant, while variation in family size contributes
very slightly to larger elasticities in some countries, including Estonia, France, Ireland, Por-
tugal and Spain. However, these di¤erences are only signicant in a few cases, and certainly
do not explain the bulk of country di¤erences. Once controlling for these composition e¤ects,
the residual term corresponding to "overall" di¤erences in labor supply responsiveness shows
a signicantly positive e¤ect for Greece, Ireland and Spain (the high-elasticity group) and
a signicantly negative e¤ect for Finland, France, Sweden, the UK and the US (the low-
elasticity group). Therefore, we must conclude that di¤erences in demographic compositions
between countries are not responsible for variations in labor supply elasticities.32
4.4 Alternative Explanations
This leaves room for other explanations. Firstly, there may be genuine di¤erences in work
preferences, possibly due to long-lasting di¤erences in culture and norms vis-à-vis female
labor market participation. Secondly, and in a related manner, social preferences may vary
across countries and lead to di¤erent institutions, notably childcare arrangements. It may
be that di¤erences in some of the estimated parameters, and particularly the xed costs of
work, reect country heterogeneity vis-à-vis non-simulated policies. Furthermore, di¤erences
in industrial or occupational composition might also play a role, given that employment in,
e.g., the Nordic countries is often reported to be more stable due to better work-family
reconciliation policies. The data at hand does not allow probing such di¤erences across
countries, which we leave for future research. Finally, an explanation in terms of selection
can be suggested: we nd that marriage rates are signicantly higher in high-elasticity
countries (the fraction of married women over single women is 6:3 in Ireland or 5:6 in Spain,
compared to an average of 3:9 over all countries); hence, it could be that married women
in these countries cover a large range of the distribution of elasticities while the relatively
smaller fraction of women who marry in France, the Nordic countries, the UK and the US
32We have checked that alternative decomposition paths given the path dependency of the method 
provide similar results. Similar conclusions are also obtained when using the "net wage" elasticities.
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Figure 10: Deviation to the Mean Hour Elasticity due to Demographic Characteristics
are in the low range of this distribution. If this was the case, one would expect to nd larger
elasticities among single women in the latter group of countries. However, our main results
show that it is not the case the cross-country correlation between elasticities of married
and single women is positive (:25) and thus this possible explanation can be ruled out.
5 Concluding Discussion
This paper presents new evidence on labor supply elasticities in 17 EU countries and the US.
Given the e¤ort applied in adopting a common empirical approach, estimates are more com-
parable than is usually the case in the literature, with results extremely robust to modeling
assumptions and specication tests. The main lesson from the exercise is that elasticities
are more modest than usually considered, with international di¤erences relatively small.
Furthermore, we also show that the remaining variation across countries relates little to dif-
ferences in tax-benet systems, heterogeneity in demographic composition or selection into
marriage. Instead, it may rather reect di¤erences in individual and social preferences across
countries, and primarily di¤erences in work preferences and childcare policies, as captured
by variation in labor supply parameters. As far as married women are concerned, these dif-
ferences contribute to more intermittent labor force participation patterns in Greece, Ireland
and Spain, as opposed to more consistent participation and more constant hours in other
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countries, notably France, the Nordic countries, the UK and the US.33
Future work should consider both time and country variation. The present study was based
on data years for which policy simulations were available for EU states. For a subgroup
of countries, we have used two years of data, with a three-year interval characterized by
important tax-benet reforms. This source of exogenous variation is usually called upon to
improve the identication of behavioral parameters. In our case, results are not very sensitive,
pointing to good performances of the cross-sectional identication strategy based on spatial
variation and tax-benet nonlinearities. In the elasticity of taxable income literature, changes
in income between pairs of years also relate to changes in marginal tax rates between these
years, albeit pooling a long panel of tax returns (see Saez et al., 2012). Ideally, we would like
to gather many years of data for each country, thus allowing for more exogenous variations
in net wages. However, this is certainly an enormous task when trying to compare many
countries and accounting for complete tax-benet systems.
Other improvements are necessary, notably a better modeling of demand-side constraints,
although this was not possible with the data at hand. A bias may stem from assuming
that non-workers choose to be so. This primarily concerns single individuals, for whom
involuntary unemployment may be an issue, yet not so much married women and single
mothers, two groups who frequently choose non-participation on a voluntary basis due to
xed costs of work and preferences. Information on local unemployment could be used to
better address labor market constraints, as in Keane and Mo¢ tt (1998); an interpretation is
that job search costs are higher in a bad economy, which leads to higher utility costs of work.
Rationing may not only a¤ect participation but also hours, and accordingly, information on
both actual and desired hours of work could be used in this case to disentangle supply
and demand sides. Usually, related studies simply estimate labor supply models on desired
hours (e.g. Callan et al., 2009). However, even when this variable is available, it is di¢ cult
to ensure that answers to the preferred hours question only reect preferences and are not
themselves contaminated by constraints (as could be the case for discouraged workers).
Despite these restrictions, we believe that the estimates provided in this paper can be useful
for researchers who want to implement optimal tax or CGE models in a comparative frame-
work and need to refer to "reasonable" values from the literature. In particular, our results
can be exploited for applications in the eld of taxation. Two recent studies (Immervoll et
al., 2007 and 2011) have conducted international comparisons of redistributive systems in
Europe, and their results could be reassessed in the light of the estimates provided in the
present study. Immervoll et al. (2007) measure the implicit cost of redistribution using plau-
sible elasticities and sensitivity analyses yet without information on actual cross-country
33This result corroborates the ndings of Heim (2007) regarding the time variation of elasticities in the
US. Considering time rather than cross-country variation, Heim (2007) also nds that higher participation
rates coincide with much smaller elasticities, and that this trend is not due to demographic changes but
more likely rather to shifts in work preferences over time.
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di¤erences. They assume that participation elasticity decreases with income levels, and the
implications of this are crucial for welfare analysis (Eissa et al., 2008). Notably, the optimal-
ity of policies that support the working poor, compared to traditional "demogrant" policies,
depends fundamentally on this assumption. While very limited evidence exists, the present
study broadly supports this assumption for single individuals, providing a precise range of
estimates for each country.
Moreover, international comparisons of the tax treatment of couples by Immervoll et al.
(2011)  essentially the long-studied issue of joint versus individual taxation  could be
reevaluated using our new evidence on couples labor supply elasticities. Related to this
point, Heckman (1993) noted "whether labor supply behavior by sex will converge to equality
as female labor-force participation continues to increase is an open question". This question
has thus far remained open, and the present study contributes to answering it. In fact, we can
draw from our results that male-female di¤erentials in participation rates are strongly neg-
atively correlated with male-female di¤erentials in participation elasticities (corr =  :89).34
Hence, the Ramsey argument against the high implicit taxation of secondary earners and
subsequent deadweight loss from joint taxation (or, more frequently, from joint income as-
sessment for benet or tax credit eligibility) can now be assessed on the basis of comparable
estimates for many countries.
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A Descriptive Statistics and Hour Distribution
Table A.1 presents the datasets used and the main statistics of the sample selected for
wage and labor supply estimations. As further described in the next section for the wage
estimations, demographics are dened across countries in a comparable manner. The number
of children corresponds to children living in the household. For comparability purposes,
we only dene three education categories ("high", corresponding to tertiary education and
reported in Table A.1, "low" corresponding to no education and junior school, and "middle").
Table A.2 reports the hour distribution for all countries. Hours are based on contract hours
in order to avoid seasonality issues for datasets collected in time of bank holidays or holidays.
In all countries, earnings correspond to basic salary plus bonuses and additional payments.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics (Selected Samples)
Country AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
Year 98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98 01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Data ECHP ECHP IDS HBS SHIW SOEP ECHP HBS HBS HBS CPS
Couples
Women
Age 39 39 40 38 40 38 39 39 39 38 40 42 39 38 37 39 39 37 38 39 41 43 38 39 39
Tertiary educ. .26 .09 .10 .38 .42 .20 .26 .30 .33 .24 .12 .21 .09 .27 .12 .17 .26 .29 .35 .31 .36 .40 .19 .19 .33
Hourly wage 9.9 11.4 12.8 13.3 10.4 10.2 10.1 11.4 11.8 3.8 7.6 10.8 7.4 11.4 4.3 5.6 6.4 8.6 11.3 10.3 11.6 2.0 2.1 2.3 13.8
Weekly hours 17.2 24.1 24.5 28.6 31.7 23.2 23.9 19.7 20.8 13.3 11.3 17.7 15.1 18.6 27.5 12.2 15.0 21.3 22.6 28.3 30.6 33.4 28.8 23.2 26.9
Weekly hours* 29.9 32.8 32.4 34.4 37.4 33.9 33.0 29.8 29.6 36.6 29.4 29.5 33.0 25.4 38.0 34.5 34.9 30.3 30.3 32.3 33.0 38.9 38.9 37.9 38.1
Particip. rate .57 .73 .75 .83 .85 .68 .73 .66 .70 .36 .38 .60 .46 .73 .72 .35 .43 .70 .75 .88 .93 .86 .74 .61 .71
Men
Age 42 41 42 40 42 40 41 41 41 42 42 44 42 41 40 41 41 39 40 42 43 45 41 41 41
Tertiary educ. .26 .12 .13 .37 .38 .19 .25 .38 .39 .26 .18 .23 .10 .34 .09 .23 .27 .28 .31 .30 .32 .23 .17 .14 .32
Hourly wage 14.9 14.3 15.6 16.4 14.0 12.6 12.9 15.3 16.2 5.4 10.9 14.9 9.2 16.3 5.5 7.3 8.2 12.8 16.6 13.5 15.8 2.7 2.8 3.2 20.3
Weekly hours 40.8 39.2 39.7 37.5 37.8 38.5 38.3 35.3 35.5 38.5 32.4 37.0 36.3 39.2 40.8 37.6 39.7 37.8 37.9 35.6 36.8 36.0 37.7 33.3 41.1
Weekly hours* 42.1 42.0 41.7 40.9 41.5 41.4 40.7 38.1 38.2 42.6 41.6 40.4 39.9 40.7 42.2 43.1 42.6 44.3 42.8 38.5 38.3 40.9 42.1 38.7 44.4
Particip. rate .97 .93 .95 .92 .91 .93 .94 .92 .93 .90 .78 .91 .91 .96 .97 .87 .93 .85 .89 .93 .96 .88 .89 .86 .93
# children 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.5
1(children 0-2) .13 .14 .14 .18 .15 .19 .18 .13 .11 .10 .23 .17 .14 .18 .17 .14 .16 .20 .17 .18 .15 .03 .15 .15 .19
Single women
Age 40 41 42 38 42 39 40 38 38 43 40 41 42 39 44 42 42 38 39 37 40 45 43 42 40
Tertiary educ. .32 .10 .11 .35 .38 .24 .31 .33 .39 .24 .13 .19 .12 .33 .15 .31 .35 .25 .32 .29 .34 .35 .22 .23 .27
Hourly wage 11.3 11.6 13.3 13.2 10.9 10.1 10.6 12.4 12.3 3.6 7.4 9.7 8.0 11.6 5.0 6.3 7.2 8.9 11.8 10.6 11.8 2.0 2.6 2.5 13.4
Weekly hours 29.3 25.2 27.2 27.5 31.0 29.7 28.8 25.8 26.9 21.9 17.8 22.7 26.8 25.2 29.7 26.7 28.0 20.3 22.3 25.8 29.7 33.6 33.7 26.2 32.7
Weekly hours* 34.4 35.3 34.6 34.5 37.9 35.1 34.9 33.1 33.2 39.3 34.9 31.2 35.2 31.8 37.7 37.6 36.2 33.1 33.8 32.1 33.0 39.3 39.4 37.1 40.4
Particip. rate 0.85 0.72 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.81 0.56 0.51 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.71 0.78 0.61 0.66 0.80 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.71 0.81
# children 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0
Single men
Age 38 40 43 37 39 38 39 38 38 38 41 41 39 37 40 40 40 38 40 35 38 40 41 41 40
Tertiary educ. .26 .09 .07 .34 .27 .22 .31 .36 .34 .34 .20 .17 .16 .35 .06 .25 .29 .31 .35 .21 .27 .14 .17 .14 .27
Hourly wage 13.6 12.3 14.0 15.0 11.7 11.3 11.2 14.3 14.5 4.7 8.7 10.4 8.6 13.0 4.5 6.6 7.2 11.0 13.9 11.3 13.4 1.7 2.5 2.4 15.9
Weekly hours 37.0 35.0 34.7 31.9 30.7 33.7 33.2 31.7 32.6 31.7 25.3 27.4 28.5 35.0 33.2 28.0 33.2 29.3 32.3 26.6 30.9 30.7 33.0 23.1 36.2
Weekly hours* 39.7 40.6 41.3 38.2 40.5 39.1 37.8 36.8 36.5 41.3 41.0 37.9 37.8 37.8 42.1 40.4 40.6 42.2 40.4 34.5 34.9 40.4 41.0 36.8 42.8
Particip. rate 0.93 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.76 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.77 0.62 0.72 0.75 0.93 0.79 0.69 0.82 0.70 0.80 0.77 0.88 0.76 0.80 0.63 0.84
# children 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2
Sample size 1,323 1,933 1,480 1,912 4,813 6,377 5,764 4,490 4,164 1,634 1,898 1,502 3,014 2,569 1,812 2,857 2,344 3,197 3,070 9,861 7,499 1,547 2,683 14,695 38,119
* Participants only
Selected sample: household with working-age adults (either employed, unemployed or inactive). For this table and the following ones: Policy years are 1998, 2001 or 2005; Countries are: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium,
DK=Denmark, FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IE=Ireland, IT=Italy, NL=the Netherlands, PT=Portugal, SP=Spain, UK=the United Kingdom, SW=Sweden, EE=Estonia,
HU=Hungary, PL=Poland, US=the United States. Reported years correspond to the period when income information was collected. Datasets are: ECHP=European Community Household Panel, PSB=Panel Survey
on Belgian Households, HBS=Household Budget Survey, IDS=Income Distribution Survey, SOEP=German or Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, LIS=Living in Ireland Survey, SHIW=Survey of Households Income and
Wealth, FES=Family Expenditure Survey, CPS=Current Population Survey. Hourly wage rates are converted in 2001 euros (predicted for non-participants).
PSB HBS SOEP LIS ECHP IDSFES
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Table A.2: Distributions of Weekly Worked Hours (Selected Samples)
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
All males
0 - 4 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.12
5 - 14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
15 - 24 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04
25 - 34 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.03
35 - 44 0.72 0.66 0.65 0.69 0.66 0.67 0.51 0.66 0.70 0.59 0.43 0.59 0.66
45 - 54 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.10
55+ 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.04
All females
0 - 4 0.33 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.30 0.27 0.33 0.28 0.61 0.59 0.35 0.51
5 - 14 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01
15 - 24 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.20 0.10
25 - 34 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.04
35 - 44 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.51 0.64 0.42 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.25 0.19 0.27 0.31
45 - 54 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
55+ 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US Mean
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
All males
0 - 4 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.10 0.11
5 - 14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
15 - 24 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03
25 - 34 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06
35 - 44 0.67 0.62 0.55 0.61 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.65 0.73 0.67 0.78 0.56 0.62
45 - 54 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.10
55+ 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.06
All females
0 - 4 0.27 0.23 0.60 0.55 0.32 0.27 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.22 0.36 0.26 0.32
5 - 14 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04
15 - 24 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.11
25 - 34 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.11
35 - 44 0.20 0.44 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.71 0.60 0.57 0.49 0.38
45 - 54 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.03
55+ 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01
This table represents the distribution of weekly working hours for our selected samples.
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B Estimates of the Wage Equation
As explained in the paper, we rst proceed with a Heckman-corrected wage estimation to
predict wages for all the individuals in our sample. The wage equation depends on human
capital variables: cubic form of age, education and basic family status (men in couple are
known to earn more than single men, women with many children have often stopped working
so their productivity has decreased). We choose three education groups for comparability
purposes (with "low", corresponding to "no education or junior school", as the omitted
category); more detailed education groups would be di¢ cult to dene in a comparable way
across countries. The Heckman selection correction relies on a participation probit which
can be seen as a (linearized reduced form) approximation of the extensive margin of the
labor supply model, with the somewhat usual exclusion restrictions for identication (see
van Soest, 1995). That is, it depends on the same variables plus detailed information about
children and "other" incomes. The latter correspond to partners and other family members
income as well as capital income of various sources. The di¤erent income sources have been
dened in a harmonized way within the EUROMOD project (see Sutherland, 2007). The
assumption of normality of the wage residual is made. The tables below report the results of
the Heckman-corrected wage estimations for each country and for men and women separately.
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Table B.1: Wage Estimations: Women
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 94 98 95 01 97 00 94 94 00 95
Log Wage
Age 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.37 0.69 0.12 0.06 0.45 0.45 0.33 0.28 0.10 0.10
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age square -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.16 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age cubic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ: middle 0.12 0.29 0.31 0.14 0.14 0.36 0.32 0.15 0.25 0.49 0.30 0.19 0.53
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
Educ: High 0.32 0.49 0.58 0.25 0.35 0.93 0.74 0.41 0.48 0.85 0.78 0.51 0.92
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12)
In couple 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.11 -0.04
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
# children -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.11 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
# children 0-2 -0.11 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.30 0.05 0.03 0.24 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.15 -0.03
(0.11) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
constant 2.35 2.29 2.37 -0.71 -5.09 1.76 2.52 -1.84 -1.95 -2.75 -0.09 2.74 1.63
(0.75) (0.66) (0.73) (0.56) (0.56) (0.37) (0.36) (0.40) (0.38) (1.33) (0.50) (0.44) (0.72)
Participation
1(children 0-2) -1.28 -0.44 -0.40 -0.58 -0.57 -0.50 -0.79 -1.76 -1.83 -0.30 -0.45 -0.47 -0.12
(0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
1(children 3-6) -0.55 -0.24 -0.42 -0.17 -0.25 -0.32 -0.41 -1.05 -1.14 0.01 -0.48 -0.38 -0.06
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
1(children 7-12) -0.34 -0.56 -0.31 0.07 -0.04 -0.30 -0.40 -0.54 -0.49 -0.10 -0.30 -0.26 -0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
1(children 13-17) -0.29 -0.09 -0.39 0.14 -0.10 -0.20 -0.21 -0.10 -0.13 0.03 -0.16 -0.13 -0.21
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
1(children 18+) -0.01 -0.13 0.20 -0.24 0.07 -0.20 -0.17 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11 0.03
(0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.23) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Age -0.23 0.28 0.32 -0.71 -0.37 0.21 0.16 -0.07 0.01 0.26 0.14 -0.09 0.15
(0.13) (0.16) (0.19) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07)
Age square 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.19 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Age cubic -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ: middle 0.29 0.87 0.83 0.61 0.20 0.56 0.49 0.34 0.35 0.40 0.66 0.52 0.78
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Educ: High 0.68 1.51 1.56 1.04 0.69 1.24 0.94 0.66 0.72 1.08 1.05 0.97 1.08
(0.10) (0.16) (0.19) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
In couple -0.73 0.00 -0.18 0.39 0.16 -0.31 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.50 -0.27 -0.45 -0.50
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
Other income -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.18 -0.01 -0.11 -0.11 -0.25 -0.26 -0.01 -0.14 -0.30 -0.08
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.00) (0.11) (0.12) (0.05)
constant 4.16 -4.08 -4.40 8.71 4.83 -2.87 -2.19 1.23 0.39 -4.78 -1.54 1.53 -3.30
(1.52) (1.92) (2.33) (1.62) (0.87) (0.79) (0.87) (0.93) (0.95) (1.14) (0.97) (1.13) (0.81)
Mills ratio -0.20 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.46 0.42 0.34 0.08 0.16 0.31 0.08 -0.38 0.32
(0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.24) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.21) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19)
# observations 1,763 2,037 1,551 1,835 5,720 7,236 6,276 4,389 3,990 3,123 3,323 2,554 5,196
Note: dummy variables for regions were also included; `other income' corresponds to other household incomes divided by 10,000. Std. errors in brackets.
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Table B.2: Wage Estimations: Women (cont.)
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
99 00 95 99 96 01 97 01 05 05 05 05
Log Wage
Age 0.41 -0.16 -.026 -0.03 0.20 0.15 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.25
(0.05) (0.06) (.052) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)
Age square -0.09 0.04 .023 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06
(0.01) (0.02) (.014) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Age cubic 0.01 0.00 -.003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ: middle 0.24 0.42 .255 0.32 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.26 0.35 0.48 0.17
(0.06) (0.06) (.052) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
Educ: High 0.46 0.95 .672 0.72 0.52 0.47 0.14 0.35 0.67 0.95 1.07 0.37
(0.07) (0.11) (.078) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02)
In couple 0.00 0.09 .053 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (.045) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
# children -0.09 0.04 -.003 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (.018) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
# children 0-2 0.21 0.05 .064 0.10 0.09 -0.04 -0.48 -0.49 0.04 -0.10 -0.12 0.12
(0.04) (0.04) (.047) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
constant -1.45 5.00 2.917 3.23 1.17 1.94 4.48 4.56 1.54 0.53 -0.88 0.62
(0.55) (0.86) (.662) (0.66) (0.36) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (1.06) (0.82) (0.28) (0.17)
Participation
1(children 0-2) -0.27 -0.27 -.279 -0.22 -0.90 -0.88 -0.22 -0.35 -0.55 -0.07 -0.66 -0.39
(0.09) (0.08) (.075) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.20) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03)
1(children 3-6) -0.53 -0.26 -.363 -0.29 -0.60 -0.53 -0.23 -0.32 -0.34 -0.27 -0.30 -0.28
(0.08) (0.08) (.062) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03)
1(children 7-12) -0.40 -0.23 -.177 -0.36 -0.44 -0.38 -0.13 -0.21 -0.32 -0.17 -0.22 -0.20
(0.07) (0.07) (.052) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03)
1(children 13-17) -0.14 -0.19 -.144 -0.13 -0.17 -0.23 -0.15 -0.08 -0.09 -0.22 -0.04 -0.05
(0.08) (0.06) (.051) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03)
1(children 18+) -0.36 -0.08 -.042 -0.16 -0.34 -0.38 0.00 -0.30 0.01 0.13 0.03
(0.14) (0.08) (.055) (0.06) (0.17) (0.14) (0.00) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03)
Age -0.13 0.48 .141 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.04 0.41 0.28 0.24 0.18
(0.11) (0.09) (.079) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04) (0.03)
Age square 0.04 -0.11 -.021 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (.021) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Age cubic 0.00 0.01 .000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ: middle 0.67 0.46 .540 0.49 0.24 0.08 0.76 0.83 0.76 0.55 0.54 0.34
(0.07) (0.08) (.055) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)
Educ: High 0.95 1.55 1.086 0.92 0.56 0.35 1.17 1.13 1.12 1.19 1.29 0.53
(0.08) (0.14) (.058) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03)
In couple -0.15 -0.16 -.427 -0.43 0.13 0.06 0.53 0.39 0.16 -0.08 -0.05 0.03
(0.09) (0.07) (.056) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Other income -0.16 0.00 -.008 -0.52 0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 -0.36 0.04
(0.08) (0.00) (.001) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01)
constant 2.34 -5.67 -2.230 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.94 0.47 -4.84 -3.81 -3.61 -1.71
(1.33) (1.01) (.951) (1.07) (0.88) (0.86) (0.92) (1.04) (1.76) (1.37) (0.44) (0.38)
Mills ratio -0.10 -0.51 .116 0.30 0.08 0.25 -0.24 0.08 0.23 0.28 0.53 -0.54
(0.15) (0.20) (.118) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.17) (0.19) (0.30) (0.24) (0.06) (0.09)
# observations 2,715 2,968 4,482 3,559 4,082 3,865 6,672 5,807 1,838 3,075 21,197 24,552
Note: dummy variables for regions were also included; `other income' corresponds to other household incomes divided by 10,000. Std. errors in brackets.
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Table B.3: Wage Estimations: Men
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 94 98 95 01 97 00 94 94 00 95
Log Wage
Age 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.31 0.50 0.18 0.18 0.60 0.47 0.65 0.11 0.15 -0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.25) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Age square -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.04 -0.14 -0.11 -0.14 -0.01 -0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age cubic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ: middle 0.17 0.18 0.28 0.08 0.12 0.26 0.20 -0.03 0.16 0.38 0.27 0.15 0.29
(0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02)
Educ: High 0.41 0.41 0.56 0.24 0.36 0.75 0.53 0.10 0.39 0.77 0.64 0.49 0.68
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.05) (0.15) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03)
In couple 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.05 -0.11 0.07 0.61 0.30 0.23 0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.24) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
# children -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
# children 0-2 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
constant 2.96 2.47 3.67 0.34 -2.42 1.14 1.74 -2.94 -2.18 -7.31 1.66 2.17 4.07
(0.47) (0.61) (0.60) (0.49) (0.40) (0.29) (0.28) (0.62) (0.33) (3.65) (0.41) (0.37) (0.76)
Participation
1(children 0-2) -0.02 -0.14 0.21 -0.08 -0.03 -0.14 0.03 -0.23 -0.05 -0.18 -0.16 -0.10 0.12
(0.20) (0.16) (0.24) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) (0.14) (0.10)
1(children 3-6) 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.08 -0.21 0.08 -0.22 -0.19 -0.16
(0.18) (0.14) (0.17) (0.13) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08)
1(children 7-12) 0.31 -0.06 -0.20 0.10 -0.01 0.03 -0.26 -0.02 -0.02 0.13 -0.15 -0.07 -0.04
(0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
1(children 13-17) -0.04 0.03 0.16 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.14
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
1(children 18+) -0.11 0.36 0.46 -0.18 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 -0.09 0.02 0.00 0.04
(0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.24) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07)
Age -0.10 0.21 0.03 -0.14 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.18 -0.03 0.47 -0.15 0.08 0.19
(0.17) (0.17) (0.23) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07)
Age square 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.02 -0.10 0.04 -0.02 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Age cubic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ: middle 0.46 0.43 0.33 0.29 0.17 0.18 0.28 0.23 0.31 0.17 0.58 0.50 0.18
(0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Educ: High 0.34 0.43 0.39 0.46 0.61 0.57 0.44 0.50 0.67 0.55 0.99 0.74 0.12
(0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08)
In couple 0.29 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.66 0.66 0.62 0.47 0.36 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.70
(0.15) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07)
Other income 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.19 -0.12 0.00 0.03 -0.20 0.11
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08) (0.00) (0.12) (0.19) (0.06)
constant 1.96 -2.90 -0.03 2.48 1.19 1.24 0.70 2.27 0.62 -6.27 1.75 -0.14 -3.23
(1.91) (2.07) (2.84) (1.61) (0.83) (0.91) (0.95) (0.97) (1.07) (1.27) (0.92) (1.21) (0.84)
Mills ratio 0.27 -0.40 0.05 -0.24 -0.51 0.32 -0.30 -1.00 -0.03 1.55 0.26 -0.21 -0.40
(0.52) (0.22) (0.21) (0.41) (0.29) (0.14) (0.13) (0.48) (0.24) (0.70) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21)
# observations 1,682 1,923 1,474 1,760 5,684 6,408 5,645 3,999 3,710 2,174 2,818 2,219 4,709
Note: dummy variables for regions were also included; `other income' corresponds to other household incomes divided by 10,000. Std. errors in brackets.
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Table B.4: Wage Estimations: Men (cont.)
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
99 00 95 99 96 01 97 01 05 05 05 05
Log Wage
Age 0.37 0.14 .041 -0.12 0.20 0.12 0.07 0.00 -0.09 0.09 0.18 0.20
(0.04) (0.05) (.038) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
Age square -0.08 -0.03 .003 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (.010) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Age cubic 0.01 0.00 -.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ: middle 0.16 0.34 .294 0.28 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.11 0.03 0.32 0.32
(0.02) (0.03) (.026) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
Educ: High 0.44 1.08 .611 0.55 0.39 0.52 0.46 0.55 0.41 0.67 0.84 0.57
(0.03) (0.05) (.031) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03)
In couple 0.10 0.26 .251 0.30 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.15 0.04 0.55 0.22
(0.03) (0.05) (.052) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
# children 0.02 -0.03 -.020 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (.011) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
# children 0-2 0.01 0.01 .033 0.00 0.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (.032) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
constant -0.97 1.04 2.171 4.27 1.41 2.25 3.12 4.00 4.15 1.55 -0.61 0.77
(0.42) (0.63) (.519) (0.57) (0.41) (0.39) (0.30) (0.38) (1.01) (0.75) (0.27) (0.18)
Participation
1(children 0-2) 0.07 0.04 -.143 -0.22 -0.26 -0.40 -0.26 -0.24 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 -0.09
(0.16) (0.14) (.090) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03)
1(children 3-6) -0.33 -0.41 -.072 -0.17 -0.20 -0.14 -0.04 -0.25 -0.04 -0.24 0.05 -0.06
(0.14) (0.12) (.077) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03)
1(children 7-12) 0.12 -0.16 -.020 -0.05 -0.14 -0.18 -0.22 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.02 -0.13
(0.14) (0.10) (.062) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
1(children 13-17) -0.09 0.03 -.053 0.12 -0.05 -0.17 -0.13 -0.15 -0.19 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.14) (0.09) (.058) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
1(children 18+) 0.23 0.01 .100 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.18 -0.22 0.22 0.22 0.08
(0.28) (0.11) (.061) (0.08) (0.22) (0.19) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03)
Age -0.71 0.59 .209 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.33 0.35 0.36 0.04 0.11
(0.16) (0.11) (.075) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03)
Age square 0.20 -0.14 -.041 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 -0.09 -0.09 0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (.020) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Age cubic -0.02 0.01 .002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Educ: middle 0.24 -0.12 .169 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.73 0.45 0.42 0.65 0.33 0.31
(0.11) (0.10) (.061) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03)
Educ: High 0.38 0.63 .492 0.46 0.29 0.43 1.00 0.55 0.92 1.21 0.80 0.62
(0.12) (0.21) (.067) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04) (0.03)
In couple 0.49 0.99 .704 0.72 0.57 0.49 -0.01 0.97 0.61 0.43 0.82 0.43
(0.13) (0.10) (.066) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Other income -0.80 -0.01 -.010 -1.19 1.26 -0.09 1.93 -0.07 0.15 0.01 -0.43 0.03
(0.12) (0.00) (.002) (0.23) (0.30) (0.22) (0.90) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01)
constant 9.51 -6.30 -2.672 0.71 0.22 0.41 0.00 4.59 -3.96 -4.24 -1.08 -0.96
(1.93) (1.20) (.869) (1.13) (0.99) (1.00) (0.00) (1.07) (1.50) (1.23) (0.44) (0.36)
Mills ratio 0.06 0.49 .398 0.71 -0.48 -0.03 0.00 0.67 -0.62 -0.54 0.60 0.12
(0.13) (0.18) (.131) (0.20) (0.18) (0.34) (0.00) (0.20) (0.33) (0.24) (0.09) (0.15)
# observations 2,544 2,597 4,004 3,148 3,335 3,198 6,746 5,865 1,632 3,146 19,146 29,182
Note: dummy variables for regions were also included; `other income' corresponds to other household incomes divided by 10,000. Std. errors in brackets.
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C Labor Supply Model: Estimates
In Tables C.1-C.8, we report the maximum-likelihood estimates of the 7-discrete-choice model
of labor supply. We report the estimates for each individual year, as used to calculate baseline
elasticities. Estimates of the utility function parameters show relatively stable results over
time, when two years of data are available. This is reassuring about the fact that preferences
do not change substantially over the three-year interval. The variable "region" corresponds
to broad regional categories (for instance, Paris region versus the rest of France), so it does
not compromise the identication of the model based on thinner regional variation in tax-
benet rules. Broad regional information is missing in our samples for Denmark and the
Netherlands. The variable "elderly", i.e. the presence of dependent parents aged 70 or
above, is also ignored in the specication for Danish couples and Swedish single men since
the selected samples for these groups contained almost no such observations.
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Table C.1: Labor Supply Estimations: Couples (1/4)
Coeff. AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
income² / 10,000 0.002 0.021 0.004 0.025 0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.034 -0.013 0.115 -0.007 -0.010 0.007
(.009) (.011) (.014) (.009) (.008) (.003) (.004) (.007) (.005) (.020) (.009) (.005) (.008)
hm² -7.808 -8.751 -8.357 -9.467 -10.331 -8.973 -6.869 -9.220 -9.712 -5.728 -3.821 -6.324 -8.193
(.433) (.383) (.428) (.468) (.283) (.210) (.181) (.275) (.308) (.305) (.237) (.324) (.286)
hf² -3.815 -5.126 -5.080 -6.805 -9.757 -4.836 -5.144 -3.833 -3.610 -6.834 -3.079 -4.114 -5.074
(.293) (.255) (.291) (.358) (.272) (.140) (.154) (.155) (.152) (.491) (.251) (.271) (.243)
hm x income /1,000 -0.061 -0.068 -0.056 -0.128 -0.077 -0.028 -0.035 -0.050 -0.084 -0.216 -0.136 -0.023 -0.114
(.027) (.019) (.027) (.022) (.015) (.007) (.010) (.014) (.014) (.028) (.018) (.015) (.016)
hf x income /1,000 -0.041 -0.046 -0.023 -0.103 -0.062 -0.026 -0.030 -0.023 -0.037 -0.120 -0.038 -0.009 -0.005
(.017) (.016) (.023) (.018) (.012) (.005) (.007) (.011) (.010) (.022) (.015) (.013) (.014)
hm x hf /1,000 0.919 0.935 0.932 2.119 1.080 0.546 0.460 1.061 1.456 0.870 2.083 0.697 0.936
(.289) (.178) (.265) (.225) (.115) (.086) (.105) (.146) (.164) (.169) (.169) (.212) (.146)
income -0.027 0.023 0.016 0.001 0.017 0.008 -0.004 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.032 0.025 0.031
(.010) (.009) (.010) (.007) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.011) (.008) (.007) (.009)
x spouses' mean age/10 0.018 -0.007 -0.003 0.004 -0.007 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.004) (.003) (.004)
x spouses' mean age² /100 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000)
# children -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000)
hm 0.874 0.472 0.551 0.709 0.667 0.555 0.392 0.582 0.640 0.545 0.206 0.237 0.589
(.100) (.069) (.086) (.069) (.038) (.032) (.034) (.045) (.052) (.067) (.054) (.073) (.063)
x male age/10 -0.119 0.123 0.048 0.034 0.099 0.088 0.085 0.039 0.033 -0.008 0.068 0.134 0.038
(.046) (.031) (.039) (.032) (.016) (.014) (.016) (.020) (.023) (.030) (.026) (.033) (.028)
x male age² /100 0.012 -0.015 -0.006 -0.005 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 -0.006 -0.005 0.001 -0.009 -0.016 -0.004
(.005) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.003)
# children 0.020 0.003 0.014 0.013 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.030 0.021 -0.005 0.000 -0.009 0.008
(.006) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.004)
x 1(region) § 0.004 -0.022 -0.018 0.012 0.003 0.015 0.013 -0.005 0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.020
(.006) (.007) (.010) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.005) (.003)
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Table C.2: Labor Supply Estimations: Couples (2/4)
Coeff. AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 94 98 95 01 97 00 94 94 00 95
hf 0.300 0.181 0.081 0.355 0.555 0.129 0.207 0.172 0.187 0.352 -0.039 -0.047 0.146
(.073) (.054) (.066) (.055) (.032) (.025) (.028) (.032) (.036) (.057) (.053) (.067) (.048)
x female age/10 -0.015 0.094 0.126 0.060 0.099 0.107 0.078 0.029 0.010 0.073 0.111 0.158 0.089
(.035) (.026) (.033) (.028) (.014) (.013) (.014) (.016) (.018) (.023) (.027) (.033) (.023)
x female age² /100 -0.002 -0.014 -0.018 -0.010 -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009 -0.018 -0.021 -0.012
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.003)
x 1(children 0-2) -0.009 -0.015 0.004 0.014 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.034 -0.067 -0.011 -0.010 -0.036 -0.005
(.019) (.010) (.011) (.011) (.009) (.005) (.006) (.010) (.011) (.020) (.009) (.010) (.010)
x 1(children 3-6) -0.040 -0.016 -0.021 -0.008 -0.012 -0.008 -0.012 -0.067 -0.068 0.004 -0.035 -0.036 0.000
(.007) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.004) (.002) (.003) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.003)
x 1(children 7-12) -0.032 -0.025 -0.024 0.000 -0.004 -0.008 -0.013 -0.035 -0.051 -0.003 -0.038 -0.033 -0.001
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.004) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.003)
x 1(children 13-17) -0.022 -0.007 -0.029 0.001 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 0.009 -0.016 -0.021 0.002
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.007) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.003)
x 1(elderly) 0.016 -0.009 0.000 0.026 0.000 -0.013 0.018 -0.028 0.014 0.004 0.010 -0.002
(.011) (.020) (.024) (.022) (.009) (.012) (.012) (.014) (.007) (.011) (.014) (.006)
x 1(region) § -0.014 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.024 0.029 0.008 -0.002 -0.006 -0.027
(.005) (.007) (.008) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.003)
fixed cost for male labour 11.951 13.882 12.730 15.586 16.090 13.310 8.990 11.943 12.897 10.157 7.638 10.319 13.098
(.783) (.692) (.724) (.815) (.472) (.372) (.297) (.403) (.457) (.606) (.436) (.602) (.527)
# children -0.288 -0.089 -0.142 0.415 0.085 -0.003 -0.084 0.477 0.356 -0.221 0.088 -0.306 0.141
(.269) (.165) (.204) (.214) (.111) (.089) (.087) (.120) (.124) (.192) (.091) (.127) (.142)
x 1(children 0-2) -0.521 -0.180 -1.072 -0.947 -0.439 -0.057 -0.673 -0.148 -0.474 0.317 0.191 -0.796 -0.429
(.831) (.353) (.644) (.368) (.211) (.161) (.236) (.254) (.327) (.366) (.184) (.366) (.253)
fixed cost for female labour 4.209 5.900 5.427 8.324 12.743 5.532 5.065 4.057 3.718 10.092 3.818 4.260 6.758
(.338) (.333) (.357) (.481) (.394) (.181) (.186) (.176) (.176) (.674) (.284) (.328) (.323)
# children -0.301 -0.187 -0.237 0.022 0.187 0.286 0.220 -0.255 -0.425 0.372 0.071 0.030 0.177
(.118) (.097) (.111) (.130) (.074) (.047) (.052) (.063) (.062) (.135) (.067) (.086) (.090)
x 1(children 0-2) 1.798 0.052 0.800 1.166 0.961 0.469 0.818 1.290 0.691 -0.312 0.550 0.087 0.232
(.596) (.368) (.409) (.448) (.341) (.191) (.202) (.315) (.306) (.715) (.294) (.323) (.343)
Nb of observations 928 1,332 1,024 1,169 3,351 4,463 3,851 2,927 2,675 1,192 1,508 1,123 2,271
Log-Likelihood -2491 -3722 -2874 -2952 -8349 -12443 -11159 -7806 -7138 -2980 -3925 -3207 -5832
pseudo-R2 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.28 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.34
§ Region dummy corresponds to Wienna & Niederoesterreich, Brussels, Helsinki, Paris region, East Germany, Dublin, Southern Italy (n.a. for Denmark). Std. errors in
brackets.
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Table C.3: Labor Supply Estimations: Couples (3/4)
Coeff. NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
income² / 10,000 0.022 0.035 0.078 0.051 0.001 0.003 -0.069 -0.034 -0.023 -0.116 -0.021 -0.001
(.008) (.010) (.009) (.007) (.004) (.003) (.007) (.004) (.054) (.065) (.004) (.000)
hm² -7.730 -7.847 -6.165 -6.025 -6.489 -6.378 -5.875 -7.319 -14.578 -9.997 -20.452 -8.684
(.328) (.335) (.246) (.255) (.270) (.269) (.141) (.171) (.690) (.384) (.276) (.088)
hf² -4.057 -6.991 -3.637 -4.421 -3.285 -3.995 -4.688 -4.757 -9.710 -7.766 -14.287 -5.879
(.227) (.312) (.227) (.274) (.163) (.184) (.117) (.117) (.493) (.323) (.246) (.068)
hm x income /1,000 -0.152 -0.144 -0.199 -0.149 -0.073 -0.082 -0.004 0.006 -0.084 -0.088 -0.028 0.016
(.019) (.019) (.016) (.016) (.011) (.010) (.013) (.010) (.052) (.039) (.009) (.001)
hf x income /1,000 -0.060 -0.025 -0.101 -0.053 -0.016 -0.031 -0.001 0.007 -0.058 0.069 0.072 0.003
(.016) (.014) (.014) (.012) (.008) (.007) (.011) (.008) (.035) (.035) (.009) (.000)
hm x hf /1,000 0.936 1.079 1.277 1.033 0.927 1.327 0.899 0.997 0.401 0.396 -0.017 -0.145
(.233) (.160) (.137) (.159) (.116) (.134) (.105) (.118) (.188) (.123) (.045) (.028)
income -0.024 -0.013 0.007 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 0.000 0.006 0.010 0.003
(.006) (.012) (.008) (.008) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.028) (.027) (.006) (.001)
x spouses' mean age/10 0.016 0.009 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.003 -0.001
(.003) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.014) (.014) (.003) (.000)
x spouses' mean age² /100 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.002) (.002) (.000) (.000)
# children -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000)
hm 0.777 0.668 0.528 0.440 0.509 0.572 0.407 0.514 1.270 0.858 1.441 0.627
(.066) (.066) (.052) (.063) (.038) (.044) (.029) (.038) (.091) (.057) (.027) (.012)
x male age/10 -0.047 0.012 0.019 0.056 0.034 -0.007 0.006 0.009 -0.036 -0.018 0.081 0.050
(.032) (.029) (.024) (.029) (.016) (.020) (.014) (.018) (.034) (.024) (.008) (.005)
x male age² /100 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.002 -0.012 -0.007
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.003) (.001) (.001)
# children 0.025 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.003
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.007) (.004) (.002) (.001)
x 1(region) § -0.001 0.005 0.009 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.006 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.005
(.005) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.006) (.005) (.002) (.001)
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Table C.4: Labor Supply Estimations: Couples (4/4)
Coeff. NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
99 00 95 99 96 01 97 01 05 05 05 05
hf 0.327 0.507 0.125 0.227 0.122 0.196 0.131 0.148 0.670 0.512 0.878 0.377
(.052) (.050) (.045) (.055) (.033) (.037) (.026) (.029) (.065) (.048) (.025) (.009)
x female age/10 -0.026 0.008 0.076 0.045 0.046 0.039 0.068 0.076 0.030 0.026 0.109 0.040
(.027) (.022) (.022) (.026) (.017) (.019) (.014) (.015) (.027) (.022) (.009) (.004)
x female age² /100 -0.002 -0.004 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.011 -0.002 -0.003 -0.015 -0.005
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.001) (.000)
x 1(children 0-2) -0.065 -0.027 -0.046 -0.021 -0.040 -0.070 0.015 -0.026 -0.136 -0.051 -0.006 -0.018
(.008) (.013) (.009) (.011) (.007) (.009) (.005) (.005) (.036) (.014) (.007) (.003)
x 1(children 3-6) -0.039 -0.017 -0.013 -0.006 -0.044 -0.038 0.001 -0.018 -0.014 -0.018 -0.009 -0.018
(.006) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.007) (.004) (.002) (.001)
x 1(children 7-12) -0.031 -0.006 -0.003 -0.019 -0.035 -0.036 0.001 -0.023 0.005 -0.007 -0.010 -0.012
(.006) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.003) (.006) (.004) (.001) (.001)
x 1(children 13-17) -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010 -0.014 0.003 -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.005
(.006) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.003) (.006) (.004) (.001) (.001)
x 1(elderly) -0.022 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 0.009 0.009 -0.014 0.029 -0.011 0.001 -0.004 -0.006
(.065) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.015) (.013) (.003) (.030) (.010) (.006) (.002) (.003)
x 1(region) § 0.000 0.015 0.015 -0.003 -0.015 0.018 0.010 -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.006
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.006) (.004) (.001) (.001)
fixed cost for male labour 11.641 12.922 11.256 10.382 12.081 11.008 7.340 8.581 22.788 16.312 28.615 14.444
(.547) (.655) (.484) (.496) (.520) (.496) (.222) (.271) (1.210) (.723) (.416) (.172)
# children 0.442 -0.570 -0.047 -0.377 0.267 0.292 0.044 0.275 0.079 0.002 0.196 0.027
(.165) (.172) (.131) (.135) (.134) (.133) (.074) (.086) (.263) (.165) (.081) (.039)
x 1(children 0-2) 0.027 -2.582 0.429 0.260 0.182 -0.127 -0.008 -0.308 0.637 -0.546 -0.137 -0.034
(.331) (1.541) (.190) (.325) (.176) (.216) (.145) (.189) (.528) (.269) (.104) (.077)
fixed cost for female labour 3.008 8.462 6.020 6.050 3.115 3.857 4.009 3.880 13.328 10.614 19.963 8.487
(.210) (.448) (.313) (.347) (.194) (.224) (.151) (.166) (.776) (.512) (.357) (.106)
# children -0.208 0.273 0.112 0.289 -0.118 -0.195 -0.100 0.039 0.133 0.172 0.190 0.008
(.075) (.083) (.084) (.086) (.069) (.074) (.056) (.059) (.140) (.100) (.034) (.021)
x 1(children 0-2) -1.229 -0.299 -1.197 -0.644 0.365 -0.247 0.689 0.102 -2.744 -0.090 0.800 0.216
(.224) (.492) (.306) (.402) (.233) (.258) (.167) (.177) (1.212) (.519) (.285) (.100)
Nb of observations 1,806 1,364 2,189 1,742 2,020 1,849 5,551 4,787 917 1,619 10,361 23,116
Log-Likelihood -4900 -3687 -5631 -4413 -6125 -5521 -16350 -13796 -2195 -4229 -22155 -64790
pseudo-R2 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.38 0.33 0.45 0.28
§ Region dummy corresponds to Lisboa, Catalunya, London, Stockholm, Tallin, Budapest region, Warsaw region, US metropolitain areas (n.a. for the
Netherlands). Std. errors in brackets.
47
Table C.5: Labor Supply Estimations: Single Women
Coeff. AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
income² / 10,000 -0.058 0.007 -0.073 -0.040 -0.150 -0.072 -0.061 -0.097 -0.050 -0.041 -0.242 -0.125 -0.087
(.051) (.050) (.071) (.040) (.043) (.017) (.017) (.031) (.033) (.130) (.070) (.032) (.036)
hours² / 1,000 -0.092 -0.269 -0.099 -0.320 0.035 -0.015 0.014 -0.056 -0.108 -0.171 0.156 0.144 0.046
(.074) (.079) (.099) (.065) (.046) (.024) (.027) (.052) (.056) (.104) (.071) (.056) (.048)
hours x income / 1,000 -0.092 -0.269 -0.099 -0.320 0.035 -0.015 0.014 -0.056 -0.108 -0.171 0.156 0.144 0.046
(.074) (.079) (.099) (.065) (.046) (.024) (.027) (.052) (.056) (.104) (.071) (.056) (.048)
income -0.045 0.021 0.098 -0.033 -0.020 -0.015 0.014 -0.021 -0.020 -0.034 0.021 0.012 -0.049
(.027) (.030) (.047) (.015) (.013) (.011) (.010) (.013) (.014) (.043) (.034) (.022) (.033)
x age/10 0.026 -0.002 -0.036 0.028 0.015 0.012 -0.004 0.017 0.016 0.019 -0.002 -0.001 0.024
(.013) (.015) (.022) (.009) (.007) (.006) (.005) (.007) (.007) (.022) (.018) (.011) (.016)
x age² /100 -0.003 0.000 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003
(.001) (.002) (.003) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.002)
x # children -0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
hours 0.526 0.138 -0.059 0.457 0.856 0.254 0.152 0.422 0.324 0.562 0.300 0.138 0.644
(.179) (.124) (.219) (.104) (.075) (.055) (.045) (.072) (.081) (.142) (.168) (.163) (.176)
x age/10 -0.080 0.061 0.212 -0.069 -0.011 0.064 0.125 -0.030 -0.005 0.014 0.000 0.025 -0.122
(.084) (.063) (.110) (.061) (.031) (.027) (.022) (.037) (.041) (.067) (.085) (.087) (.085)
x age² /100 0.007 -0.009 -0.029 0.007 0.000 -0.009 -0.016 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.000 -0.007 0.014
(.010) (.008) (.013) (.008) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.005) (.005) (.008) (.011) (.011) (.010)
x 1(children 0-2) -0.045 0.066 0.099 0.036 -0.028 -0.030 -0.009 -0.136 -0.098 0.003 -0.273 -0.020 -0.089
(.059) (.064) (.064) (.035) (.051) (.021) (.024) (.061) (.055) (.118) (.148) (.031) (.127)
x 1(children 3-6) -0.013 -0.029 -0.043 0.025 -0.017 -0.011 -0.016 -0.068 -0.085 -0.031 -0.077 -0.025 0.017
(.020) (.018) (.018) (.016) (.010) (.008) (.008) (.011) (.013) (.019) (.028) (.016) (.018)
x 1(elderly) 0.036 0.015 0.021 0.057 -0.025 0.009 -0.012 0.013 -0.033 0.002 0.012 0.012 -0.001
(.029) (.021) (.027) (.079) (.020) (.009) (.010) (.016) (.018) (.010) (.015) (.018) (.008)
x 1(region) § -0.007 0.027 -0.008 0.026 0.024 0.019 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.018 0.007 -0.021
(.011) (.012) (.013) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.012) (.010) (.007)
fixed cost 4.727 4.712 5.503 7.155 15.717 6.539 6.127 6.469 5.450 11.264 8.396 3.637 8.149
(.914) (.535) (.735) (.757) (.992) (.463) (.367) (.430) (.430) (1.313) (1.144) (.633) (.672)
x # children -0.230 -0.652 -0.552 -0.636 -0.121 0.180 0.327 -0.567 -0.001 0.071 0.094 -0.008 -0.426
(.327) (.220) (.280) (.349) (.216) (.117) (.114) (.180) (.193) (.298) (.311) (.248) (.251)
x 1(children 0-2) -0.273 4.063 4.745 3.140 0.402 -0.172 1.317 -0.135 -0.253 2.027 -3.703 2.732 -0.778
(1.950) (2.270) (2.651) (1.527) (1.910) (.754) (.857) (1.401) (1.367) (4.849) (2.616) (1.056) (3.798)
x high educ. 0.278 -0.550 -0.132 -0.548 -0.378 -0.867 -0.845 -0.083 -0.518 -0.194 -1.454 -1.125 -2.029
(.559) (.315) (.400) (.403) (.239) (.306) (.182) (.219) (.263) (.363) (.521) (.470) (.330)
Nb of observations 217 334 249 392 738 1118 1167 906 813 291 202 220 409
Log-Likelihood -333 -488 -353 -491 -915 -1677 -1733 -1265 -1169 -341 -220 -333 -620
pseudo-R2 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.40 0.44 0.22 0.22
`Note: Region dummy corresponds to Wienna & Niederoesterreich, Brussels, Helsinki, Paris region, East Germany, Dublin, Southern Italy. Region not available for
Denmark. Std. errors in brackets.
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Table C.6: Labor Supply Estimations: Single Women (cont.)
Coeff. NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
income² / 10,000 0.027 0.151 0.027 0.081 -0.061 -0.043 -0.128 -0.099 0.331 0.101 -0.014 -0.006
(.033) (.040) (.033) (.042) (.022) (.012) (.036) (.024) (.281) (.266) (.039) (.001)
hours² / 1,000 -0.208 -0.226 -0.110 -0.194 0.028 0.008 -0.087 -0.060 -0.184 -0.099 -0.036 -0.003
(.064) (.067) (.046) (.063) (.036) (.031) (.044) (.036) (.168) (.124) (.036) (.000)
hours x income / 1,000 -0.208 -0.226 -0.110 -0.194 0.028 0.008 -0.087 -0.060 -0.184 -0.099 -0.036 -0.036
(.064) (.067) (.046) (.063) (.036) (.031) (.044) (.036) (.168) (.124) (.036) (.005)
income -0.028 -0.071 0.014 0.006 0.020 0.015 -0.025 -0.028 -0.023 -0.049 0.016 0.008
(.012) (.039) (.026) (.024) (.013) (.010) (.007) (.008) (.070) (.063) (.015) (.002)
x age/10 0.019 0.039 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.036 -0.008 0.007
(.007) (.019) (.012) (.011) (.007) (.005) (.004) (.005) (.035) (.031) (.008) (.001)
x age² /100 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 -0.017
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.004) (.004) (.001) (.000)
x # children -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.006 -0.002 0.000
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.004) (.003) (.001) (.000)
hours 0.282 0.322 0.148 0.333 0.164 0.170 0.174 0.243 1.029 0.787 0.658 5.252
(.083) (.124) (.130) (.146) (.072) (.062) (.030) (.050) (.121) (.114) (.042) (.210)
x age/10 0.040 0.011 0.098 0.067 0.015 0.043 0.014 -0.015 -0.021 -0.021 0.087 0.020
(.042) (.057) (.062) (.069) (.036) (.030) (.017) (.027) (.050) (.051) (.017) (.008)
x age² /100 -0.008 -0.001 -0.014 -0.010 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.012 -0.002
(.006) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.003) (.006) (.006) (.002) (.001)
x 1(children 0-2) -0.111 0.192 -0.041 -0.058 -0.026 -0.011 0.025 -0.010 0.029 0.070 -0.030 -0.027
(.062) (.029) (.015) (.023) (.036) (.027) (.014) (.019) (.107) (.055) (.021) (.006)
x 1(children 3-6) -0.041 0.028 -0.002 -0.044 -0.038 -0.040 0.000 -0.007 0.002 -0.035 -0.017 -0.010
(.018) (.024) (.011) (.014) (.009) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.015) (.011) (.004) (.002)
x 1(elderly) -0.024 0.007 -0.014 -0.008 0.007 0.011 0.008 -0.004 -0.010 -0.010 -0.014 -0.010
(.044) (.011) (.008) (.010) (.012) (.012) (.006) (.007) (.010) (.010) (.003) (.002)
x 1(region) 0.042 0.003 -0.007 -0.017 0.008 0.009 0.017 0.012 0.013 0.007 0.006
(.011) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.003) (.005) (.009) (.007) (.003) (.002)
fixed cost 5.271 6.579 6.202 7.147 4.235 5.117 4.321 3.785 19.329 14.882 15.123 10.259
(.537) (.767) (.618) (.722) (.465) (.509) (.241) (.389) (1.385) (.964) (.461) (.200)
x # children -0.350 -0.880 -0.160 -0.239 0.502 0.320 0.058 0.107 0.232 -0.187 0.199 0.114
(.201) (.253) (.191) (.255) (.134) (.133) (.109) (.118) (.236) (.197) (.072) (.039)
x 1(children 0-2) -0.685 9.216 -0.629 -0.944 1.538 1.537 1.248 0.843 2.343 5.158 -0.315 -0.661
(1.517) (1.892) (.931) (1.397) (1.060) (.923) (.543) (.676) (4.478) (2.339) (.760) (.254)
x high educ. -1.073 -2.041 -0.691 -1.259 -0.708 -0.539 -1.307 -1.102 -1.744 -1.645 -1.221 0.032
(.329) (.940) (.275) (.373) (.311) (.336) (.184) (.331) (.418) (.288) (.096) (.064)
Nb of observations 450 278 373 329 753 779 1924 1307 476 646 3106 9277
Log-Likelihood -636 -407 -575 -498 -1019 -1114 -3115 -2168 -564 -803 -3864 -12690
pseudo-R2 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.30 0.27 0.17 0.15 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.30
Note: Region dummy corresponds to Lisboa, Catalunya, London, Stockholm, Tallin, Budapest region, Warsaw region, US metropolitain areas. Region not available
for the Netherlands. Std. errors in brackets.
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Table C.7: Labor Supply Estimations: Single Men
Coeff. AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 94 98 95 01 97 00 94 94 00 95
income² / 10,000 -0.041 0.102 0.131 0.076 -0.032 0.026 0.053 0.037 0.056 0.076 -0.082 -0.157 -0.010
(.031) (.070) (.082) (.025) (.037) (.009) (.019) (.034) (.025) (.073) (.064) (.070) (.033)
hours² / 1,000 -8.681 -9.255 -5.686 -4.361 -7.244 -6.165 -5.427 -3.753 -4.470 -5.948 -2.150 -5.057 -7.862
(1.007) (1.014) (.984) (.620) (.539) (.403) (.399) (.439) (.469) (.870) (.707) (1.029) (.755)
hours x income / 1,000 0.035 -0.275 -0.656 -0.314 -0.156 -0.076 -0.186 -0.287 -0.335 -0.041 -0.264 0.042 -0.074
(.062) (.107) (.141) (.058) (.055) (.029) (.041) (.067) (.061) (.075) (.101) (.130) (.053)
income -0.033 0.071 -0.049 0.037 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.040 0.070 0.005 0.012
(.028) (.034) (.050) (.015) (.012) (.012) (.010) (.013) (.014) (.059) (.034) (.046) (.028)
x age/10 0.017 -0.023 0.051 -0.015 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.019 -0.024 0.016 -0.005
(.016) (.017) (.023) (.008) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.030) (.017) (.024) (.013)
x age² /100 -0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.001
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.004) (.002) (.003) (.002)
x # children -0.008 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.007 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.008 0.015 -0.002
(.008) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.004) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.005) (.004) (.009) (.002)
hours 0.648 0.589 1.026 0.278 0.575 0.341 0.169 0.291 0.244 0.457 0.094 0.572 0.396
(.211) (.141) (.231) (.113) (.070) (.068) (.057) (.076) (.089) (.249) (.190) (.380) (.191)
x age/10 0.009 0.091 -0.247 0.089 0.039 0.084 0.153 0.036 0.092 0.001 0.086 -0.170 0.132
(.116) (.063) (.107) (.062) (.033) (.033) (.028) (.040) (.046) (.132) (.094) (.192) (.089)
x age² /100 -0.004 -0.010 0.032 -0.013 -0.007 -0.011 -0.020 -0.006 -0.014 0.001 -0.011 0.020 -0.017
(.015) (.008) (.012) (.008) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.017) (.011) (.023) (.010)
x # children 0.062 0.070 0.054 0.031 -0.014 0.029 0.023 0.034 0.049 0.015 -0.011 -0.060 0.023
(.061) (.036) (.031) (.027) (.018) (.011) (.010) (.012) (.013) (.023) (.023) (.067) (.013)
x 1(elderly) -0.010 0.029 0.044 0.071 0.006 -0.014 0.008 0.038 0.046 -0.022 0.047 0.019 0.000
(.019) (.018) (.026) (.024) (.009) (.009) (.011) (.014) (.016) (.012) (.014) (.016) (.010)
x 1(region) 0.032 -0.029 -0.025 0.012 0.020 0.009 -0.011 0.003 0.017 -0.027 -0.029 -0.044
(.015) (.014) (.017) (.005) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.010) (.011) (.014) (.008)
fixed cost 12.268 16.034 12.524 9.423 12.730 9.491 7.380 6.469 6.961 9.755 7.789 7.161 11.997
(1.643) (1.603) (1.460) (.948) (.830) (.681) (.558) (.560) (.636) (1.359) (1.030) (1.106) (1.123)
x high educ. -1.445 -1.521 -0.983 -0.468 -0.562 -0.812 -0.726 0.313 0.675 -0.986 -1.669 1.054 -0.211
(.793) (.472) (.568) (.386) (.198) (.377) (.268) (.322) (.390) (.488) (.508) (.634) (.340)
Nb of observations 176 267 207 351 724 796 746 657 676 151 188 159 334
Log-Likelihood -219 -315 -240 -473 -990 -1160 -1084 -984 -947 -222 -240 -208 -455
pseudo-R2 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.34 0.33 0.30
Note: Region dummy corresponds to Wienna & Niederoesterreich, Brussels, Helsinki, Paris region, East Germany, Dublin, Southern Italy. Region not available for
Denmark. Std. errors in brackets.
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Table C.8: Labor Supply Estimations: Single Men (cont.)
Coeff. NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US
99 00 95 99 96 01 97 01 05 05 05 05
income² / 10,000 -0.017 -0.060 0.054 0.059 0.049 -0.010 -0.049 -0.016 1.919 -0.292 0.089 -0.002
(.023) (.071) (.048) (.039) (.026) (.016) (.029) (.015) (1.310) (.221) (.087) (.001)
hours² / 1,000 -4.102 -6.063 -8.780 -6.384 -4.383 -5.626 -1.852 -2.235 -7.287 -6.190 -10.332 -6.375
(.573) (.804) (.968) (.662) (.585) (.596) (.188) (.226) (1.026) (.518) (.520) (.170)
hours x income / 1,000 -0.100 -0.103 -0.180 -0.125 -0.211 -0.101 -0.197 -0.168 -0.742 0.069 -0.146 -0.060
(.062) (.111) (.067) (.057) (.060) (.047) (.040) (.032) (.406) (.132) (.057) (.006)
income 0.026 0.028 0.136 0.018 0.045 0.013 -0.022 -0.015 -0.232 0.045 0.041 0.009
(.018) (.057) (.044) (.034) (.013) (.014) (.006) (.007) (.088) (.078) (.030) (.002)
x age/10 -0.011 -0.007 -0.064 -0.014 -0.018 -0.001 0.020 0.012 0.108 -0.019 -0.015 0.000
(.010) (.029) (.021) (.016) (.007) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.045) (.039) (.015) (.001)
x age² /100 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.012 0.003 0.002 0.000
(.001) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.006) (.005) (.002) (.000)
x # children 0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.008 0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.002 -0.042 -0.003 0.005 0.000
(.004) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.031) (.007) (.003) (.000)
hours -0.046 0.605 -0.025 0.474 0.191 0.437 0.191 0.253 1.016 0.443 0.690 0.461
(.123) (.176) (.235) (.225) (.085) (.097) (.026) (.048) (.169) (.125) (.053) (.022)
x age/10 0.216 -0.057 0.390 0.081 0.121 0.016 -0.023 -0.027 -0.162 0.035 0.057 0.038
(.070) (.083) (.112) (.105) (.040) (.045) (.015) (.027) (.070) (.059) (.019) (.009)
x age² /100 -0.030 0.006 -0.048 -0.013 -0.014 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.017 -0.006 -0.009 -0.005
(.009) (.010) (.013) (.012) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.003) (.008) (.007) (.002) (.001)
x # children -0.007 -0.011 0.015 -0.048 -0.013 -0.046 0.032 0.003 0.067 0.010 0.005 -0.005
(.026) (.008) (.016) (.029) (.012) (.016) (.009) (.010) (.044) (.013) (.003) (.003)
x 1(elderly) -0.014 0.013 -0.009 -0.031 0.008 -0.001 -0.022 -0.008 -0.034 -0.028 -0.019
(.045) (.014) (.009) (.011) (.010) (.011) (.065) (.013) (.009) (.004) (.002)
x 1(region) 0.017 0.014 0.006 -0.010 -0.006 0.002 0.004 -0.015 0.034 0.000 0.005
(.014) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.003) (.004) (.014) (.008) (.004) (.002)
fixed cost 4.639 9.076 14.994 10.175 9.882 10.106 3.449 3.305 12.886 9.438 14.417 11.912
(.802) (1.233) (1.498) (1.043) (.973) (.971) (.216) (.397) (1.705) (.842) (.716) (.285)
x high educ. -0.053 -3.244 -0.575 -0.735 -0.834 -1.018 -0.874 -0.161 -1.201 -0.458 -0.804 0.114
(.575) (1.775) (.338) (.389) (.464) (.521) (.166) (.342) (.564) (.334) (.141) (.082)
Nb of observations 313 170 295 273 424 442 2386 1405 154 418 1228 5726
Log-Likelihood -467 -243 -369 -390 -629 -637 -3989 -2359 -212 -611 -1518 -7904
pseudo-R2 0.23 0.27 0.36 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.14 0.29 0.25 0.36 0.29
Note: Region dummy corresponds to Lisboa, Catalunya, London, Stockholm, Tallin, Budapest region, Warsaw region, US metropolitain areas. Region not
available for the Netherlands, too few observations with elderly for Sweden. Std. errors in brackets.
51
D Labor Supply Elasticities
For both years when available, and for each demographic group separately, Tables D.1-D.8
report the own-wage hour elasticities, compensated and uncompensated, overall and for quin-
tiles of disposable income. We distinguish the hour elasticity for the sub-group of participants
(pure intensive margin) and the participation elasticity (extensive margin). The extensive
margin is expressed in percentage change of the employment probability ("particip."). Alter-
natively, it is expressed in hour changes corresponding to participation responses ("hour"),
so this measure and the intensive margin sum up to the total uncompensated hour elastic-
ity. We show cross-wage hour elasticities for individuals in couples and income elasticities.
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in brackets for the main elasticity results.
Table D.1: Labor Supply Elasticities: Married Women
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Own-wage elasticity
Total hours .34 .28 .31 .30 .13 .23 .13 .31 .31 .62 .47 .32 .33
(.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.03)
Total hours (compensated) .34 .29 .31 .30 .13 .23 .13 .35 .31 .62 .48 .32 .32
(.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.03)
Intensive margin (hour) .05 .05 .05 .06 .01 .03 .02 .06 .08 .03 .08 .05 .05
(.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00)
Extensive margin (hour) .29 .24 .27 .24 .12 .20 .11 .24 .23 .59 .39 .27 .27
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Extensive margin (particip.) .27 .22 .23 .25 .12 .19 .10 .24 .22 .57 .42 .27 .28
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Own-wage elasticity (sub-groups)
quintile 1 total hours .34 .25 .34 .28 .12 .21 .09 .35 .31 .58 .43 .39 .30
ext. margin (hour) .29 .20 .26 .25 .11 .18 .07 .28 .23 .55 .39 .33 .27
quintile 2 total hours .32 .23 .27 .31 .11 .20 .09 .30 .30 .58 .38 .33 .29
ext. margin (hour) .28 .18 .20 .28 .11 .17 .07 .24 .22 .54 .35 .28 .26
quintile 3 total hours .32 .25 .29 .26 .12 .21 .10 .30 .31 .59 .40 .28 .29
ext. margin (hour) .26 .20 .21 .23 .12 .18 .08 .23 .22 .56 .37 .24 .25
quintile 4 total hours .33 .29 .31 .27 .14 .24 .14 .30 .31 .61 .42 .30 .32
ext. margin (hour) .26 .23 .23 .23 .13 .20 .11 .21 .21 .58 .38 .25 .27
quintile 5 total hours .37 .41 .36 .36 .16 .27 .21 .30 .34 .68 .73 .30 .40
ext. margin (hour) .29 .31 .26 .28 .15 .23 .17 .22 .23 .63 .59 .26 .34
with children total hours .35 .28 .30 .31 .14 .24 .13 .31 .34 .63 .56 .35 .31
no children total hours .31 .29 .34 .28 .12 .20 .12 .30 .28 .53 .23 .21 .38
Cross-wage elasticity
Total hours -.13 -.07 -.05 -.14 -.07 -.11 -.07 -.19 -.17 -.09 -.22 -.14 .04
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Total hours (compensated) -.13 -.06 -.05 -.14 -.07 -.10 -.07 -.11 -.18 -.09 -.20 -.14 .04
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.10 -.05 -.04 -.11 -.05 -.08 -.05 -.13 -.11 -.09 -.17 -.10 .03
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Income elasticity
Total hours -.0011 -.0021 -.0018 -.0040 .0010 -.0031 -.0023 -.0059 -.0057 -.0039 -.0082 -.0069 .0010
(.0003) (.0012) (.0014) (.0005) (.0001) (.0004) (.0006) (.0008) (.0009) (.0019) (.0007) (.0017) (.0042)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0008 -.0016 -.0012 -.0032 .0010 -.0022 -.0016 -.0043 -.0038 -.0035 -.0066 -.0071 .0009
(.0002) (.0010) (.0011) (.0004) (.0001) (.0004) (.0005) (.0006) (.0006) (.0018) (.0006) (.0016) (.0036)
Note: wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates (unearned income). The intensive margin corresponds to the response in work hours among
workers, the extensive margin to the participation response (measured either in % change in work hour: "hour", or in % change in participation rate: "particip."). All elasticities are uncompensated, except
when indicated. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
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Table D.2: Labor Supply Elasticities: Married Women (cont.)
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US Mean
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Own-wage elasticity
Total hours .32 .14 .63 .51 .12 .09 .16 .11 .08 .15 .10 .14 .265
(.03) (.02) (.05) (.05) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.03)
Total hours (compensated) .32 .14 .62 .51 .12 .09 .17 .12 .08 .15 .10 .14 .268
(.03) (.02) (.05) (.05) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.03)
Intensive margin (hour) .13 .05 .06 .08 .03 .02 .04 .05 .01 .01 .01 .02 .05
(.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Extensive margin (hour) .19 .10 .56 .43 .09 .08 .12 .06 .07 .14 .09 .12 .22
(.02) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.02)
Extensive margin (particip.) .20 .11 .53 .43 .08 .07 .11 .07 .06 .13 .09 .12 .22
(.02) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.02)
Own-wage elasticity (sub-groups)
quintile 1 total hours .24 .13 .45 .42 .09 .08 .19 .16 .07 .19 .09 .14 .25
ext. margin (hour) .17 .10 .39 .37 .07 .06 .14 .09 .05 .16 .08 .12 .21
quintile 2 total hours .25 .11 .47 .41 .09 .07 .19 .14 .08 .17 .09 .14 .24
ext. margin (hour) .17 .09 .41 .36 .07 .06 .13 .08 .06 .15 .08 .12 .20
quintile 3 total hours .32 .12 .54 .44 .10 .08 .17 .12 .08 .15 .09 .14 .24
ext. margin (hour) .20 .10 .47 .38 .07 .07 .12 .06 .06 .14 .08 .12 .20
quintile 4 total hours .34 .13 .64 .51 .12 .10 .15 .10 .09 .14 .10 .14 .26
ext. margin (hour) .21 .11 .56 .43 .09 .08 .10 .06 .07 .12 .09 .12 .21
quintile 5 total hours .45 .21 .93 .72 .17 .14 .12 .06 .09 .12 .12 .15 .33
ext. margin (hour) .27 .15 .77 .60 .11 .11 .09 .04 .07 .09 .11 .11 .26
with children total hours .33 .16 .68 .59 .13 .11 .18 .11 .07 .16 .10 .15 .28
no children total hours .31 .10 .46 .35 .10 .07 .14 .12 .11 .11 .12 .13 .23
Cross-wage elasticity
Total hours -.08 .00 -.05 .03 -.04 -.07 -.04 -.03 -.03 .04 .08 .01 -.064
(.04) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.02)
Total hours (compensated) -.08 .00 -.06 .03 -.04 -.07 -.03 -.03 -.03 .04 .07 .01 -.059
(.04) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.02)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.05 .00 -.05 .02 -.02 -.04 .00 -.01 -.02 .04 .08 .01 -.04
(.03) (.01) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.02)
Income elasticity
Total hours -.0008 .0000 -.0005 .0004 -.0028 -.0022 -.0080 -.0023 -.00004 .00001 .0001 -.00003 -.0024
(.0007) (.0001) (.0003) (.0008) (.0005) (.0004) (.0008) (.0004) (.00001) (.00006) (.0000) (.00009) (.0008)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0008 .0000 -.0004 .0003 -.0019 -.0015 -.0036 -.0010 -.00002 .00000 .0001 .0000 -.0017
(.0005) (.0001) (.0003) (.0007) (.0004) (.0003) (.0005) (.0002) (.00001) (.00004) (.0000) (.00008) (.0006)
Note: wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates (unearned income). The intensive margin corresponds to the response in work hours among
workers, the extensive margin to the participation response (measured either in % change in work hour: "hour", or in % change in participation rate: "particip."). All elasticities are uncompensated, except
when indicated. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
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Table D.3: Labor Supply Elasticities: Married Men
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Own-wage elasticity
Total hours .07 .13 .12 .15 .10 .09 .06 .13 .14 .11 .26 .15 .04
(.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01)
Total hours (compensated) .07 .13 .12 .15 .10 .09 .06 .15 .14 .11 .29 .16 .05
(.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01)
Intensive margin (hour) .02 .02 .02 .02 .00 .02 .02 .03 .03 .01 .00 .03 -.01
(.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00)
Extensive margin (hour) .05 .11 .10 .14 .10 .07 .04 .10 .11 .11 .26 .12 .05
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01)
Extensive margin (particip.) .05 .10 .09 .13 .10 .07 .04 .10 .11 .10 .27 .12 .05
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01)
Own-wage elasticity (sub-groups)
quintile 1 total hours .08 .15 .16 .20 .12 .10 .05 .19 .18 .12 .41 .21 .03
ext. margin (hour) .06 .13 .13 .20 .12 .08 .04 .16 .16 .10 .39 .16 .05
quintile 2 total hours .08 .11 .12 .16 .10 .09 .05 .12 .13 .11 .26 .16 .03
ext. margin (hour) .05 .09 .09 .16 .10 .07 .03 .09 .11 .10 .25 .12 .04
quintile 3 total hours .07 .10 .11 .11 .09 .09 .05 .13 .13 .11 .21 .14 .03
ext. margin (hour) .05 .08 .08 .11 .09 .07 .03 .10 .10 .10 .22 .11 .04
quintile 4 total hours .07 .12 .10 .11 .08 .08 .06 .12 .12 .11 .18 .12 .04
ext. margin (hour) .04 .09 .07 .09 .08 .06 .04 .09 .09 .09 .21 .10 .05
quintile 5 total hours .07 .16 .11 .18 .10 .08 .09 .10 .12 .13 .26 .14 .06
ext. margin (hour) .04 .11 .08 .11 .09 .06 .05 .09 .09 .12 .29 .14 .08
Cross-wage elasticity
Total hours -.01 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.05 -.06 -.04 -.07 -.02 -.04
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Total hours (compensated) -.01 -.02 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.05 -.04 -.06 -.02 -.03
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01)
Extensive margin (particip.) .00 -.01 .00 -.03 -.02 .00 .00 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.03
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00)
Income elasticity
Total hours -.0003 -.0015 -.0019 -.0027 .0010 .0001 -.0004 -.0031 -.0036 -.0047 -.0097 -.0036 -.0168
(.0001) (.0005) (.0005) (.0004) (.0001) (.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0010) (.0006) (.0006) (.0023)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0001 -.0010 -.0011 -.0021 .0010 .0005 .0001 -.0020 -.0022 -.0034 -.0077 -.0022 -.0129
(.0000) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0003) (.0008) (.0005) (.0005) (.0019)
Note: wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates (unearned income). The intensive margin corresponds to the response in work hours among
workers, the extensive margin to the participation response (measured either in % change in work hour: "hour", or in % change in participation rate: "particip."). All elasticities are uncompensated, except
when indicated. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
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Table D.4: Labor Supply Elasticities: Married Men (cont.)
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US Mean
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Own-wage elasticity
Total hours .06 .04 .14 .08 .06 .03 .11 .07 .08 .08 .04 .08 .097
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Total hours (compensated) .06 .04 .15 .08 .06 .04 .12 .07 .08 .08 .04 .08 .100
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Intensive margin (hour) .01 .03 -.07 .07 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Extensive margin (hour) .05 .01 .22 .00 .06 .03 .11 .07 .08 .08 .04 .08 .09
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Extensive margin (particip.) .06 .03 .14 .07 .08 .06 .09 .05 .07 .07 .03 .04 .09
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.009) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.002) (.00) (.01)
Own-wage elasticity (sub-groups)
quintile 1 total hours .08 .03 .13 .06 .06 .03 .16 .12 .08 .08 .03 .09 .12
ext. margin (hour) .07 .03 .13 .06 .07 .05 .13 .08 .07 .08 .03 .07 .11
quintile 2 total hours .05 .03 .11 .06 .05 .03 .15 .10 .08 .08 .03 .08 .10
ext. margin (hour) .05 .03 .11 .06 .07 .05 .12 .06 .07 .08 .03 .05 .08
quintile 3 total hours .06 .03 .13 .07 .06 .04 .12 .07 .08 .08 .03 .08 .09
ext. margin (hour) .05 .03 .13 .06 .07 .06 .09 .05 .07 .08 .03 .05 .08
quintile 4 total hours .05 .03 .16 .08 .06 .03 .10 .05 .08 .08 .04 .07 .09
ext. margin (hour) .05 .03 .15 .07 .09 .06 .08 .04 .07 .07 .03 .04 .08
quintile 5 total hours .06 .06 .19 .11 .07 .04 .05 .02 .08 .07 .05 .07 .10
ext. margin (hour) .06 .05 .17 .08 .10 .09 .05 .03 .07 .06 .05 .02 .09
Cross-wage elasticity
Total hours -.05 -.03 -.05 -.03 -.04 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.01 .02 -.028
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Total hours (compensated) -.05 -.03 -.04 -.02 -.04 -.04 .01 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.01 .01 -.026
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.03 -.01 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.02 .01 .00 -.02 .00 -.01 .01 -.02
(.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Income elasticity
Total hours -.0017 -.0001 -.0023 -.0024 -.0056 -.0031 -.0059 -.0019 -.0001 -.0002 -.00002 .0012 -.0028
(.0003) (.0000) (.0002) (.0004) (.0005) (.0003) (.0006) (.0003) (.0000) (.0000) (.00001) (.0000) (.0004)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0008 .0000 -.0019 -.0016 -.0044 -.0022 -.0023 -.0007 .0000 -.0001 -.00002 .0008 -.0019
(.0002) (.0000) (.0002) (.0003) (.0004) (.0002) (.0003) (.0001) (.0000) (.0000) (.00001) (.0000) (.0003)
Note: wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates (unearned income). The intensive margin corresponds to the response in work hours among
workers, the extensive margin to the participation response (measured either in % change in work hour: "hour", or in % change in participation rate: "particip."). All elasticities are uncompensated, except
when indicated. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
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Table D.5: Labor Supply Elasticities: Single Women
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Wage elasticity
Total hours .14 .29 .59 .13 .21 .18 .12 .25 .18 .41 .39 .37 .67
(.05) (.05) (.08) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.03) (.05) (.10) (.08) (.09) (.09)
Total hours (compensated) .14 .30 .59 .11 .22 .18 .12 .24 .21 .43 .39 .39 .73
(.05) (.05) (.08) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.03) (.05) (.10) (.08) (.09) (.09)
Intensive margin (hour) .01 .00 .07 -.02 .00 .02 .02 .03 .01 -.01 .05 .06 .05
(.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.02)
Extensive margin (hour) .13 .29 .52 .15 .21 .16 .11 .22 .16 .42 .34 .31 .62
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.10) (.07) (.06) (.08)
Extensive margin (particip.) .13 .25 .41 .18 .20 .15 .09 .22 .17 .43 .34 .24 .58
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.10) (.07) (.06) (.08)
Own-wage elasticity (sub-groups)
quintile 1 total hours .18 .40 1.23 .26 .38 .26 .22 .32 .23 .68 .52 .63 1.33
ext. margin (hour) .15 .36 .89 .32 .35 .20 .16 .29 .21 .69 .43 .40 1.23
quintile 2 total hours .23 .36 .69 .39 .25 .25 .16 .34 .23 .42 .60 .45 .84
ext. margin (hour) .19 .28 .43 .44 .24 .18 .11 .29 .21 .42 .54 .28 .70
quintile 3 total hours .16 .29 .47 .02 .21 .20 .12 .28 .20 .36 .37 .45 .51
ext. margin (hour) .14 .25 .33 .08 .20 .15 .06 .22 .15 .37 .31 .24 .38
quintile 4 total hours .08 .19 .45 .04 .16 .17 .12 .22 .14 .33 .17 .25 .43
ext. margin (hour) .10 .17 .32 .07 .15 .14 .09 .19 .14 .35 .15 .17 .37
quintile 5 total hours .02 .26 .24 .05 .07 .05 .01 .11 .12 .38 .53 .15 .34
ext. margin (hour) .09 .22 .17 .10 .09 .09 .04 .14 .15 .40 .47 .14 .32
with children total hours .14 .33 .56 .15 .22 .22 .10 .22 .24 .57 .64 .45 .53
no children total hours .13 .27 .60 .12 .20 .16 .14 .26 .15 .30 .24 .29 .81
Income elasticity
Total hours -.0006 -.0134 -.0038 .0119 .0287 .0005 .0011 .0026 -.0061 -.0102 -.0075 -.0025 .0189
(.0005) (.0020) (.0008) (.0064) (.0054) (.0004) (.0004) (.0018) (.0017) (.0036) (.0021) (.0009) (.0229)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0003 -.0074 -.0016 .0154 .0278 .0026 .0023 .0046 -.0026 -.0092 -.0060 -.0012 .0187
(.0004) (.0014) (.0006) (.0062) (.0054) (.0004) (.0004) (.0016) (.0011) (.0035) (.0018) (.0006) (.0183)
Note: wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates (unearned income). The intensive margin corresponds to the response in work hours among
workers, the extensive margin to the participation response (measured either in % change in work hour: "hour", or in % change in participation rate: "particip."). All elasticities are uncompensated, except
when indicated. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
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Table D.6: Labor Supply Elasticities: Single Women (cont.)
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US Mean
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Wage elasticity
Total hours .16 .08 .13 .20 .40 .31 .27 .21 .12 .08 .09 .23 .248
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.05)
Total hours (compensated) .16 .08 .12 .22 .41 .31 .27 .22 .12 .10 .09 .26 .256
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.05)
Intensive margin (hour) .02 .04 .00 .04 .04 .04 .03 .06 .01 .01 .01 .03 .02
(.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Extensive margin (hour) .13 .04 .13 .16 .36 .27 .24 .15 .11 .08 .08 .20 .22
(.02) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.00) (.04)
Extensive margin (particip.) .11 .05 .14 .19 .26 .24 .18 .14 .11 .07 .07 .19 .21
(.02) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.01) (.00) (.04)
Own-wage elasticity (sub-groups)
quintile 1 total hours .16 -.02 .15 .37 .45 .38 .36 .27 .12 .14 .10 .22 .37
ext. margin (hour) .12 .01 .16 .33 .28 .27 .24 .18 .11 .13 .09 .19 .31
quintile 2 total hours .23 .02 .13 .23 .48 .38 .37 .30 .13 .08 .09 .34 .32
ext. margin (hour) .19 .04 .13 .20 .29 .29 .23 .18 .12 .08 .08 .31 .26
quintile 3 total hours .17 .03 .15 .16 .47 .38 .30 .23 .12 .07 .09 .27 .24
ext. margin (hour) .12 .05 .15 .15 .29 .28 .19 .13 .11 .06 .07 .23 .19
quintile 4 total hours .18 .10 .11 .15 .47 .33 .24 .18 .13 .07 .08 .21 .20
ext. margin (hour) .09 .08 .13 .15 .30 .24 .15 .11 .12 .06 .07 .16 .16
quintile 5 total hours .07 .23 .10 .12 .24 .15 .11 .07 .11 .07 .08 .15 .15
ext. margin (hour) .06 .07 .14 .14 .19 .16 .09 .08 .09 .05 .07 .09 .15
with children total hours .12 .07 .13 .26 .39 .35 .23 .21 .12 .09 .09 .24 .27
no children total hours .17 .10 .13 .16 .41 .29 .28 .21 .12 .08 .09 .23 .24
Income elasticity
Total hours -.0034 -.0002 -.0068 -.0072 -.0047 -.0019 .0241 .0128 .0000 .0094 .0007 -.0040 .0015
(.0008) (.0001) (.0013) (.0018) (.0013) (.0010) (.0046) (.0028) (.0000) (.0057) (.0001) (.0002) (.0027)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0020 -.0002 -.0057 -.0053 -.0017 -.0005 .0243 .0137 .0000 .0095 .0007 -.0030 .0029
(.0004) (.0000) (.0011) (.0015) (.0008) (.0008) (.0039) (.0024) (.0000) (.0057) (.0001) (.0002) (.0024)
Note: wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates (unearned income). The intensive margin corresponds to the response in work hours among
workers, the extensive margin to the participation response (measured either in % change in work hour: "hour", or in % change in participation rate: "particip."). All elasticities are uncompensated, except
when indicated. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
57
Table D.7: Labor Supply Elasticities: Single Men
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE IT
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01 98
Wage elasticity
Total hours .14 .26 .28 .26 .33 .14 .14 .14 .20 .19 .33 .67 .22
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.08) (.09) (.10) (.11)
Total hours (compensated) .14 .26 .28 .26 .36 .13 .14 .14 .19 .19 .64 .69 .26
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.08) (.09) (.10) (.11)
Intensive margin (hour) .05 .03 -.01 .03 -.01 .02 .02 .01 .01 .05 -.08 .03 .02
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Extensive margin (hour) .09 .23 .29 .23 .33 .12 .12 .14 .19 .14 .41 .65 .21
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.07) (.07) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.07) (.08) (.09) (.10)
Extensive margin (particip.) .08 .23 .27 .27 .34 .11 .12 .17 .21 .15 .43 .62 .22
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.07) (.07) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.07) (.08) (.09) (.10)
Own-wage elasticity (sub-groups)
quintile 1 total hours .16 .54 .53 .31 .83 .12 .14 .21 .30 .16 1.17 1.85 .44
ext. margin (hour) .13 .50 .53 .37 .80 .10 .12 .24 .33 .14 1.25 1.74 .42
quintile 2 total hours .15 .22 .36 .30 .24 .10 .11 .18 .19 .18 .30 .98 .23
ext. margin (hour) .12 .19 .37 .35 .26 .09 .11 .21 .22 .15 .40 .88 .23
quintile 3 total hours .13 .21 .20 .25 .22 .14 .11 .12 .19 .18 .24 .54 .17
ext. margin (hour) .08 .18 .19 .29 .24 .11 .10 .15 .22 .15 .31 .47 .17
quintile 4 total hours .11 .17 .09 .21 .20 .15 .13 .10 .14 .19 .15 .22 .16
ext. margin (hour) .04 .15 .07 .23 .23 .12 .11 .13 .16 .15 .21 .20 .16
quintile 5 total hours .13 .25 .29 .25 .19 .20 .20 .12 .21 .23 .26 .48 .16
ext. margin (hour) .06 .19 .30 .17 .23 .13 .14 .14 .14 .17 .42 .46 .17
with children total hours .25 .08 .37 .15 .47 .09 .13 .07 .09 .19 .73 .87 .16
no children total hours .12 .27 .27 .27 .31 .15 .14 .16 .22 .19 .26 .64 .24
Income elasticity
Total hours -.0003 -.003 -.008 .075 .112 .001 -.002 -.006 -.007 -.0002 -.041 -.028 -.003
(.0002) (.001) (.001) (.052) (.033) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.0012) (.005) (.006) (.024)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.0001 -.002 -.005 .077 .104 .001 .000 -.002 -.003 -.0001 -.037 -.021 .000
(.0001) (.001) (.002) (.049) (.031) (.000) (.000) (.002) (.001) (.0010) (.005) (.005) (.022)
Note: wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates (unearned income). The intensive margin corresponds to the response in work hours among
workers, the extensive margin to the participation response (measured either in % change in work hour: "hour", or in % change in participation rate: "particip."). All elasticities are uncompensated, except
when indicated. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
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Table D.8: Labor Supply Elasticities: Single Men (cont.)
NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU PL US Mean
01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05 05
Wage elasticity
Total hours .08 .03 .40 .57 .35 .21 .34 .20 .17 .16 .09 .20 .243
(.03) (.04) (.10) (.06) (.07) (.04) (.06) (.03) (.06) (.06) (.01) (.01) (.06)
Total hours (compensated) .08 .03 .40 .58 .39 .20 .34 .25 .17 .16 .17 .23 .268
(.03) (.04) (.10) (.06) (.07) (.04) (.06) (.03) (.06) (.06) (.01) (.01) (.06)
Intensive margin (hour) .01 -.02 .02 .09 .02 .01 .03 .03 .00 .01 .00 .02 .02
(.02) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
Extensive margin (hour) .07 .05 .38 .48 .33 .20 .32 .17 .17 .15 .08 .18 .23
(.02) (.04) (.10) (.06) (.07) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.05) (.06) (.01) (.01) (.05)
Extensive margin (particip.) .08 .04 .39 .47 .35 .22 .28 .18 .17 .15 .08 .18 .23
(.02) (.04) (.10) (.06) (.07) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.05) (.06) (.01) (.01) (.05)
Own-wage elasticity (sub-groups)
quintile 1 total hours .15 -.01 .58 .83 .31 .17 .45 .32 .28 .21 n.a. .21 .43
ext. margin (hour) .14 .01 .57 .78 .32 .18 .37 .27 .26 .19 n.a. .20 .42
quintile 2 total hours .10 .03 .50 .58 .34 .21 .57 .26 .19 .20 n.a. .27 .28
ext. margin (hour) .09 .04 .48 .38 .34 .21 .41 .21 .17 .20 n.a. .25 .26
quintile 3 total hours .08 .01 .33 .58 .36 .22 .39 .20 .16 .21 n.a. .22 .23
ext. margin (hour) .07 .03 .32 .46 .36 .22 .29 .17 .15 .20 n.a. .20 .21
quintile 4 total hours .06 .06 .30 .44 .35 .20 .30 .14 .14 .11 n.a. .18 .18
ext. margin (hour) .07 .07 .29 .37 .35 .22 .25 .13 .14 .10 n.a. .16 .17
quintile 5 total hours .00 .03 .32 .46 .35 .22 .12 .08 .09 .08 n.a. .14 .20
ext. margin (hour) .04 .06 .32 .40 .36 .26 .15 .11 .13 .07 n.a. .10 .20
with children total hours .22 .15 .54 .57 .61 1.25 .19 .28 .11 .13 .11 .18 .32
no children total hours .07 -.01 .37 .57 .32 .14 .35 .19 .17 .17 .08 .20 .23
Income elasticity
Total hours -.003 .000 -.007 -.012 -.021 -.005 .042 .023 .000 .061 .000 -.006 .0065
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.002) (.005) (.002) (.010) (.008) (.000) (.026) (.000) (.000) (.0073)
Extensive margin (particip.) -.001 .000 -.006 -.012 -.018 -.003 .044 .024 .000 .062 .000 -.005 .0079
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.009) (.007) (.000) (.026) (.000) (.000) (.0069)
Note: wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates (unearned income). The intensive margin corresponds to the response in work hours among
workers, the extensive margin to the participation response (measured either in % change in work hour: "hour", or in % change in participation rate: "particip."). All elasticities are uncompensated, except
when indicated. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets.
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E Robustness Checks
Table E.1 reports estimates for 7 countries where two years of data are available. We give
here a detailed account of the 1998-2001 policy changes used for the additional exogenous
variation discussed in the paper. The UK has experienced important changes in the income
tax schedule, social insurance contributions and council taxes, as well as an increased gen-
erosity of income support for the elderly (minimum income guarantee) and for families with
children. The latter have also beneted from the replacement of the family credit by the
more generous working family tax credit (WFTC) in 1999 (see Blundell et al., 2000). In
France, housing benets have been reformed in 2001 and a refundable tax credit for low-
wage individuals was introduced that year in France and Belgium. In Germany, the year
2001 corresponds to the rst step of major income tax reforms, including a widening of the
income brackets and tax cuts; child benets were also raised by more than 20% over the
period of interest. In Sweden, the income tax schedule changed with the introduction of an
additional lower income tax bracket; a special local income tax credit for low income earners
was introduced in 2001 and child benets were raised by 25% over the period. In Ireland,
substantial cuts in income tax have taken place over 1998-2001, income tax allowances were
replaced by deductible tax credits while welfare payment rates have failed to keep pace with
overall growth in disposable income. The Spanish personal income tax has undergone a
dramatic change with the reform of 1999 (reduction in the number of tax brackets from 9
to 6, cuts in the bottom and top marginal tax rates, changes in the treatment of the family
dimension through a new system of tax credits).
Results in Table E.1 compare the baseline estimates to those obtained when pooling the
two years of data and calculating separate elasticities for each year ("pooled years") or the
elasticity for the pooled sample ("pooled, mean elast."). Results are unchanged in most
cases. For France, Spain and Ireland, we now nd very similar elasticities for the two years,
which broadly correspond to the average of the two elasticities obtained from independent
estimations.
Table E.2 reports detailed estimates for the extensive specication check described in section
4.3 of the paper. The preliminary check concerns the sensitivity of the results to the way we
calculate elasticities. The rst row of each panel in Table E.2 corresponds to the baseline,
that is, a 7-choice model with quadratic utility and xed costs, whereby elasticities are
obtained by averaging expected hours over all observations (frequency method). The second
row reports the average elasticity over the 250 draws used to bootstrap standard errors in
the baseline model. The third row shows elasticities obtained with a calibration method.35
35The frequency approach implies averaging the probability of each discrete choice over all households
before and after a change in wage rates or unearned income. The calibration method, consistent with the
probabilistic nature of the model at the individual level, consists of repeatedly drawing a set of J+1 random
terms for each household from an EV-I distribution (together with terms for unobserved heterogeneity),
which generate a perfect match between predicted and observed choices (see Creedy and Kalb, 2005). The
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Reassuringly, we see very little di¤erences in the three sets of results. The following rows
correspond to specication checks, as explained and commented in the paper.
Table E.1: Robustness Checks: Improving Identication by Pooling Years
BE BE FR FR GE GE IE IE SP SP UK UK SW SW
98 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 98 01
Women in couple
baseline .28 .31 .23 .13 .31 .31 .47 .32 .63 .51 .12 .09 .16 .11
pooled years .28 .31 .17 .17 .31 .30 .47 .49 .50 .54 .09 .11 .13 .13
pooled, mean elast.
Men in couple
baseline .13 .12 .09 .06 .13 .14 .26 .15 .14 .08 .06 .03 .11 .07
pooled years .11 .13 .07 .07 .13 .12 .29 .24 .09 .10 .04 .05 .09 .07
pooled, mean elast.
All values are estimated elasticities obtained by averaging predicted frequencies before and after uniform marginal increases of wage rates. The baseline is the standard result
with a 7-choice model with fixed costs estimated on each year separately. The "pooled years" elasticities are obtained by estimating the model on pooled 1998 and 2001
samples and, hence, exploiting exogenous changes in tax-benefit policies over the period. The "pooled, mean elast." is the overall elasticity for the pooled 1998-2001 sample.
.29
.12
.17 .10 .13.52
.04 .08.10.07
.31 .48
.27.13
same draws are kept when predicting labor supply responses to an increase in wages or non-labor income.
Averaging individual responses over a large number of draws provides robust transition matrices.
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Table E.2: Robustness Checks: Specication
AT BE BE DK FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE
98 98 01 98 98 98 01 98 01 98 98 01
7 2 (baseline) .34 .28 .31 .30 .13 .23 .13 .31 .31 .62 .47 .32
7 2 * .34 .29 .31 .30 .14 .23 .13 .31 .32 .61 .49 .32
7 2 ** .38 .25 .25 .25 .12 .20 .12 .32 .34 .57 .46 .34
4 2 .33 .36 .39 .33 .14 .23 .18 .29 .32 .52 .55 .36
13 2 .36 .28 .34 .29 .14 .23 .15 .31 .31 .56 .47 .31
7 3 .34 .34 .32 .32 .14 .24 .17 .27 .31 .49 .52 .31
7 4 .36 .26 .33 .32 .14 .23 .14 .29 .31 .55 .45 .31
7 2 $ .34 .29 .31 .30 .14 .22 .15 .30 .31 .54 .47 .31
7 2 (baseline) .27 .22 .23 .25 .12 .19 .10 .24 .22 .57 .42 .27
7 2 * .28 .23 .23 .25 .13 .19 .11 .23 .22 .57 .43 .27
7 2 ** .33 .21 .20 .19 .11 .16 .10 .25 .25 .54 .37 .26
4 2 .29 .28 .30 .27 .13 .21 .15 .25 .28 .49 .51 .31
13 2 .29 .22 .25 .24 .13 .19 .11 .23 .20 .53 .41 .26
7 3 .28 .27 .24 .27 .13 .20 .13 .23 .23 .49 .48 .28
7 4 .28 .21 .25 .27 .13 .21 .12 .24 .22 .55 .44 .29
7 2 $ .27 .22 .23 .25 .12 .18 .12 .23 .21 .51 .41 .26
IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW SW EE HU US
98 01 01 98 01 98 01 98 01 05 05 05
7 2 (baseline) .40 .45 .21 .93 .72 .17 .14 .12 .06 .09 .12 .15
7 2 * -.02 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
7 2 ** -.01 -.14 -.03 -.15 .01 -.03 -.06 -.09 -.04 -.04 .01 .04
4 2 .06 -.09 -.02 -.02 .05 .00 -.07 -.01 -.03 -.02 .03 .01
13 2 .00 -.10 -.02 -.09 .02 -.04 -.06 -.03 -.04 -.01 .04 .01
7 3 .14 -.04 .00 .02 .17 .00 -.04 -.06 -.05 -.03 .01 .05
7 4 .23 -.04 -.01 .07 .22 .03 .00 -.03 -.05 -.06 .03 .05
7 2 $ .03 -.08 -.01 -.09 .00 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.02 -.02 .03 .01
7 2 (baseline) .04 -.08 .00 -.06 .03 -.04 -.07 -.03 -.03 -.03 .04 .01
7 2 * -.01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
7 2 ** -.02 -.07 -.02 -.14 -.01 -.03 -.04 -.05 -.02 -.03 .01 .04
4 2 .05 -.07 -.02 -.02 .04 .01 -.05 .00 -.02 -.01 .03 .01
13 2 .00 -.07 -.01 -.08 .01 -.02 -.02 .01 -.01 -.01 .04 .01
7 3 .21 -.02 .01 .05 .17 .00 -.01 -.03 -.03 -.03 .01 .04
7 4 .31 .03 .02 .10 .22 .02 .00 -.02 -.03 -.04 .03 .04
7 2 $ .02 -.05 -.01 -.07 .00 .00 -.02 .00 -.01 -.01 .03 .01
All values are estimated own-wage elasticities obtained by averaging predicted frequencies before and after uniform marginal increases of wage rates, except:
* Average elasticities over 200 draws of the estimated parameters in their distribution
** Elasticities calculated using the calibration method (pseudo-residuals drawn to obtain a perfect match and retained after shock on wage/non-labor income)
$ is the baseline specification with a different addition to improve the flexibility of the model (fixed costs of work are replaced by part-time dummies).
Participation
CountriesAlternative models
polynomial
order
# discrete
choices
# discrete
choices
polynomial
order
Models' specifications vary with the number of choices in the discretization and the functional form of the utility fonction. We report here the order of the polynomial in consumption and hours
(quadratic, cubic or quartic)
Elasticity
Total hours
Participation
Total hours
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F Assessing Cross-Country Di¤erences in Elasticity Size
Table F.1 reports the elements found in graphical form in Figures 8-10 of the paper: baseline
own-wage elasticities of hours for married women (column 1), elasticities when canceling
the role of di¤erent mean work hours and wages between countries (column 2), elasticities
obtained with a 1% increment in net rather than gross wages (column 3), and the elasticity
decomposition used to assess the role of di¤erent demographic compositions (column 5-8).
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Table F.1: Elasticities Decomposition
Base Mean Net Net Decomposition baseline Decomposition net wage
Levels wage +Mean Age Edu Kids Resid Age Edu Kids Resid
AT98 0.34 0.30 0.58 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.15
Std. Err. 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BE98 0.28 0.31 0.42 0.45 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.04
Std. Err. 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BE01 0.31 0.30 0.44 0.42 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.09
Std. Err. 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
DK98 0.29 0.33 0.37 0.41 -0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.10
Std. Err. 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EE05 0.08 0.68 0.09 0.78 -0.00 0.03 0.08 -0.26 0.00 0.04 0.11 -0.38
Std. Err. 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FI98 0.13 0.20 0.19 0.30 -0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.22 -0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.29
Std. Err. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR98 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 0.11 -0.08
Std. Err. 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FR01 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.15 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.21
Std. Err. 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
GE98 0.31 0.27 0.44 0.39 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.10
Std. Err. 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GE01 0.31 0.28 0.46 0.42 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.18
Std. Err. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GR98 0.62 1.06 0.72 1.24 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.42 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.41
Std. Err. 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
HU05 0.15 1.04 0.23 1.57 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.12 -0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.14
Std. Err. 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
IE98 0.47 0.34 0.83 0.60 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.45 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.98
Std. Err. 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
IE01 0.32 0.26 0.51 0.42 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.20
Std. Err. 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IT98 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.10
Std. Err. 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
NL01 0.32 0.26 0.39 0.32 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.06
Std. Err. 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PT01 0.14 0.47 0.18 0.59 -0.00 0.02 0.11 -0.12 -0.00 0.03 0.14 -0.20
Std. Err. 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SP98 0.63 0.70 0.77 0.86 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.59 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.71
Std. Err. 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
SP01 0.51 0.55 0.68 0.74 -0.00 0.03 0.10 0.27 -0.00 0.04 0.15 0.34
Std. Err. 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
SW98 0.16 0.23 0.20 0.28 -0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 -0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.14
Std. Err. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SW01 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.18 -0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 -0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.21
Std. Err. 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
UK98 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.21 -0.00 -0.00 0.06 -0.20 -0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.25
Std. Err. 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UK01 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.12 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.17 -0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.22
Std. Err. 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
US05 0.14 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.19 0.00 0.02 0.07 -0.17
Std. Err. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: the table contains own-wage elasticities with standard errors for married women in
the baseline (col. 1), in the "mean levels" scenario (col. 2), in net wage increment scenario
(col. 3) and in the combination of the two latter (col. 4). The next columns contain the
change in elasticities due to di¤erent components in the elasticity decomposition following
Heim (2007) in the baseline (col. 5-8) and the net wage increment scenario (col. 9-12).
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